THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX ACT AND PRIVATE LAW IN CANADA: COMPLEMENTARITY, DISSOCIATION, AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM

Author: David G. Duff*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction
1. Complementarity
1.1. Complementarity with the civil Law of Quebec
1.2. C omplementarity with the private law of other provinces
2. Dissociation
2.1. Gift
2.2. Charity
2.3. Employee / independent contractor
2.4. Residence
2.5. Acquisition and disposition of property
2.6. Other cases
3. Canadian Bijuralism and the Federal Income tax act
3.1. Canadian Bijuralism
3.2. Implications for the Income tax act
3.2.1. Interpretation
3.2.2. Amendment
4. Conclusion

Intoduction
In order to apply the federal Income Tax Act (hereinafter I.T.A.),[1] one must first characterize
the transactions and amounts to which different tax consequences apply. As a general rule,
Canadian courts have followed English decisions holding that these transactions and amounts
are to be understood according to "the legal rights and obligations of the parties ascertained
upon ordinary legal principles," notwithstanding their economic substance or commercial
reality.[2] As the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized in a recent decision:
… this Court has never held that the economic realities of a situation can be used to
recharacterize a taxpayer's bona fide relationships. To the contrary, we have held that, absent a
specific provision of the Act to the contrary or a finding that they are a sham, the taxpayer's
legal relationships must be respected in tax cases.[3]
As a result, it follows, applications of the I.T.A.typically involve both the public law of the
statute itself and the private law by which a taxpayer’s bona fide legal relationships are defined.
In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867 allocates general jurisdiction over private law to
provincial governments under their exclusive authority to make laws in relation to "Property and
Civil Rights".[4] As a general rule, the private law of Quebec is governed by the Civil Code,[5]
while that in other provinces (the "common law provinces") is governed both by the common
law and applicable provincial statutes.[6] In this respect, Canada may be described as a
"bijural" country in which two legal traditions coexist within a single state.[7] Correspondingly,
"bijuralism" may be defined narrowly as "the coexistence of two legal traditions within a single
state",[8] and more broadly as "the sharing of values and traditions" associated with each of the
two legal traditions.[9]
Notwithstanding exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, it is generally
recognized that the federal government may "enact rules of private law for its own purposes
when legislating in areas within its jurisdiction"[10] – which rules are paramount to the extent of
any inconsistency with provincial law.[11] As the Constitution Act, 1867 permits the federal
government to raise revenues "by any Mode or System of Taxation",[12] it thus follows that
Parliament may, for this purpose, explicitly adopt or implicitly rely upon the private law of
different provinces or "enact specific rules that are incompatible with the private law rules of one
or more or all of the provinces."[13] Where federal legislation relies on a term or concept
specific to one of Canada’s two main legal traditions, the legislation may be described as
"unijural"[14]. Alternatively, federal rules may draw upon civil and common law to create a
mixed system of law,[15] or introduce autonomous terms and concepts that transcend both
legal traditions.[16]
Where federal legislation adopts or relies upon the private law of the relevant province in order
to complete or supplement federal law, a relationship of "complementarity" exists between the
federal statute and this private law.[17] Where federal legislation disregards the private law of
the applicable province, on the other hand, relying on other legal concepts or independent rules
enacted at the federal level, a relationship of "dissociation" exists between the federal law and
the province’s private law.[18] While a relationship of complementarity or dissociation may be
explicit where a statute either expressly incorporates or specifically derogates from provincial
private law,[19] these relationships are often implicit and judicially established.[20] In these
circumstances, therefore, the relationship between federal legislation and provincial private law
is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation.
This paper examines the relationship between the I.T.A. and provincial private law, evaluating
judicial decisions and statutory provisions in light of the goals of Canadian bijuralism, expressed
in the Policy on Legislative Bijuralism adopted by the Department of Justice in June 1995,[21]
the Preamble to the first Federal Law – Civil Law Harmonization Act, No.1,[22] and recent
amendments to the federal Interpretation Act.[23] The first part of the paper reviews cases in
which Canadian courts have recognized a relationship of complementarity between the I.T.A.
and provincial private law, relying on the latter to determine the application of the former. The
second part of the paper examines cases in which Canadian courts have dissociated the I.T.A.
from provincial private law, assessing tax consequences with little or no regard to the private
law of the applicable province. The third part of the paper reviews the origins and aims of
Canadian bijuralism and its implications for the interpretation and amendment of the I.T.A. A
final part offers conclusions and recommendations.
1. Complementarity
Since the application of the federal Income Tax Act depends on "legal rights and obligations …
ascertained upon ordinary legal principles,"[24] which are generally defined by provincial
private law, it is not surprising that Canadian courts and commentators have often affirmed a
principle of complementarity between this statute and provincial private law. This part surveys a
number of income tax cases in which this principle has been expressed or applied, examining
cases in which courts have relied on the civil law of Quebec as well as those relying on judge-
made common law and/or statutory rules in other provinces.
1.1. Complementarity with the civil Law of Quebec
Among the earliest cases to affirm a principle of complementarity between the ITA and the civil
law of Quebec is Perron v. M.N.R.,[25] which involved a taxpayer who sold a hotel in 1956,
but repossessed the property under a resolutory clause of the contract when the purchaser
failed to make payments and made an assignment under the Bankruptcy Act. When the
Minister imposed recaptured depreciation on a disposition of the hotel, the taxpayer argued that
the resolutory clause effectively dissolved the contract, thereby nullifying the disposition. On
appeal, the Board held that the tax issue turned on the legal relationships established by the
private law of Quebec:
If income tax is a creation of the Act which imposes it, that Act must apply within the
framework of the civil laws governing legal relationships between individuals. The tax is
grafted, as it were, on the legal tree which covers with its shadow the rights and
obligations arising from the contracts.
… It should be remembered that the legal relationships of the parties to a contract and
the consequences of that contract must be respected by the persons responsible for
administering the Income Tax Act. What must be taken into account above all are the
real nature of the contracts and their effects on the contracting parties and on third
parties, with respect to the general law of the place — common law, or Quebec Civil
Law, as the case may be.[26]
Citing Article 1088 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada,[27] which declared that "a resolutive
condition, when accomplished, … obliges each party to restore what he has received, and
replaces things in the same state as if the contract had not existed," the Board allowed the
taxpayer’s appeal.
Another expression of this principle appears in The Queen v. Lagueux & Frères Inc.,[28] in
which the taxpayer sought to deduct rental payments on logging equipment that it had leased
under contracts including an option to purchase the equipment on favourable terms at the end of
the leases. Upholding the Minister’s assessment, which disallowed the deductions on the basis
that the transactions were properly characterized as sales, not leases, the Court emphasized that
this result depended not on statutory or judicial anti-avoidance rules favouring substance over
form, but on the actual legal relationships established under the civil law. According to Décary
J.:
In my view, the nature of the rights and obligations created by the contracts concluded by the
defendant must be arrived at by reference to the provisions of the Civil Code.
In my opinion fiscal law is an accessory system, which applies only to the effects produced by
contracts. Once the nature of the contracts is determined by the civil law, the Income Tax Act
comes into effect, but only then, to place fiscal consequences on those contracts. Without a
contract, without a law and an obligation, there can be no fiscal levy. Application of the Income
Tax Act is subject to a civil determination, whether such a determination be according to civil or
common law.
There is no need, in deciding as to the nature of the contracts, to have recourse to the theory
popular in fiscal law of form and substance, if the private law of the place where the contract
was concluded, which is the Civil Code in the case at bar, contains provisions the effect of
which is comparable to that theory.[29]
Relying on Article 1013 of the C.C.L.C., which gave priority to the "common intention" of the
parties over the contract’s "literal meaning", the Court characterized the agreements as
"conditional sales on a suspensive condition and not leases".[30]
Yet another expression of complementarity in the context of Quebec’s civil law system can be
found in Olympia and York Developments Ltd. v. The Queen,[31] in which the taxpayer
sought during the years 1970 to 1973 to deduct capital cost allowance on an apartment
complex, possession of which it had conveyed to a purchaser in 1969 pursuant to a sales
agreement delaying transfer of title until 1974. Addressing the Minister’s argument that the
taxpayer had sold the building in 1969 (whereupon it could no longer deduct capital cost
allowance), the Court explained that this issue must be decided according to the civil law of
Quebec:
It is evident that the rights of the parties to the contract and all matters governing various
agreements and legal relations arising from the actions of the parties to those agreements must
be determined in accordance with the law of the Province of Quebec….
Since there is no special definition of the word "sale" or any special meaning attached to it in the
Income Tax Act, one must consider that word in the light of the law of the Province of Quebec
as applied to the relationship created by the agreement ….[32]
For this purpose, moreover, the Court explained that English common law cases on the meaning
of the word "sale" were not relevant:
At common law, the nature of the relationship existing between a vendor and purchaser
of real estate under given circumstances is governed to a large extent by the distinctions
between legal and equitable ownerships, estates and remedies and by the principles
applicable to various categories of trusts and trustees. None of these concepts even
exists in civil law. To seek by way of common law jurisprudence to reach a solution to
the present issue would be to venture out on a perilous journey over rocky and tortuous
roads, fraught with pitfalls, which would lead to a mere cul-de-sac, if one were
fortunate.[33]
Although ultimately dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal on the basis that the 1969 transaction
amounted to a "disposition" within the meaning of the ITA,[34] the Court rejected the
Minister’s argument that the property was "sold" in 1969. On the contrary, Addy J. concluded,
based on the applicable civil law, "if the purchaser and the unpaid vendor have agreed that, until
payment a sale would not have taken place between them, there is no sale at law but merely an
executory contract that at some future date upon payment being received a sale will then take
place." [35]
While each of these cases concerned private law governing contractual relationships, others
applying a principle of complementarity between the ITA and the civil law of Quebec have
involved the law of property. In Sura v. The Queen,[36] for example, where the
taxpayerargued that the community of property regime in the C.C.L.C. permitted him to split his
salary and rental income with his wife, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on the civil law
itself, which recognized the husband as the paramount administrator of the community’s
property, to conclude that the taxpayer alone was taxable on the income of the community.[37]
According to the Court:
… if it is true that the wife is the co-owner of the community property, it is equally true
that she has not got the ordinary rights that attach to ownership: art. 406 C.C. Her right
is unformed, dismembered and inferior to that which a person who has the bare right of
property and another the beneficial right. Her right is stagnant and almost sterile because
no benefit accrues therefrom during the joint lives of the parties. It is not until after the
dissolution of the community that the wife is vested with the full power of ownership
which includes the jus utendi, fruendi et abutendi, of which her marital status had
temporarily deprived her.[38]
Subsequent cases have generally arrived at the same conclusion, based on the judgment in
Sura, supra, and the legal consequences of the C.C.L.C. and the C.C.Q.[39] In 1990,
however, this caselaw was displaced by an amendment to the I.T.A. deeming property of the
community to be owned by the spouse who owned it before it became subject to the
community or, in any other case, by the spouse who administers the property.[40]
Other decisions have relied on the civil law of Quebec to determine when or whether property
has been transferred to a spouse so as to trigger the attribution of income and capital gains,[41]
or joint and several liability for tax debts owing by the transferor at the time of the transfer.[42]
In Garant v. M.N.R.,[43] for example, Rouleau J. rejected the Minister’s application of the
attribution rules in then subsections 74(1) and (2) of the I.T.A. on the basis that, under the civil
law, no transfer of property had taken place when the taxpayer and his spouse changed their
matrimonial regime from community of property to separation of property. Similarly, in
Furfaro-Siconolfi v. The Queen,[44] where the taxpayer received $30,000 from her husband
in October 1983 at a time when he was liable to pay taxes under the Act, the Court relied on
the civil law to conclude that the taxpayer was not jointly and severally liable for her husband’s
tax debts, on the grounds that the payment did not actually transfer property but instead settled
a debt that the husband had assumed as part of a marriage contract executed in September
1977. According to Pinard J.:
… as it was a marriage contract concluded in Quebec between Quebecers who
subsequently married in Quebec, the provisions of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
must be considered.
…
It is by operation of arts. 777, 782, 878, 788, 795, 817, 821, and 1085 of the Civil
Code of Lower Canada that the gift of $30,000 stipulated in the marriage contract
here had the effect of transferring ownership of the money to the plaintiff when the
contract was signed on September 2, 1977 ….[45]
Since the taxpayer’s husband did not owe any taxes in September 1977, the subsequent
payment in October 1983 was excluded from the operation of section 160.[46]
Other cases have referred to the civil law of Quebec in order to determine whether a taxpayer
has entered into a valid partnership,[47] become entitled to a payment such that an amount can
be characterized as an amount receivable,[48] received taxable alimony or a non-taxable
compensatory allowance,[49] made a gift for the purpose of the charitable contributions
deduction,[50] or performed services as an employee or independent contractor.[51] In the
latter two circumstances, however, courts have also relied on common law principles to
interpret the applicable legal concept, thereby dissociating the meaning of these concepts for tax
purposes from the meaning established by the civil law of Quebec.
1.2. Complementarity with the private law of other provinces
While the earliest and most explicit expressions of complementarity appear in cases involving the
ITA and the civil law of Quebec, this principle has also been expressed and applied in cases
involving the private law of other provinces. As in Quebec, some of these cases involve the law
of contractual relationships, while others concern the law of property. Yet others refer to
provincial statutes governing corporate law and limitations of actions.
One of the most notable examples of complementarity between the I.T.A. and the
private law of a province other than Quebec is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Continental Bank of Canada v. The Queen,[52] in which the Minister disallowed a tax-
deferred transfer of depreciable property under subsection 97(2) of the I.T.A. on the basis that
the taxpayer had not disposed of the property to a valid partnership as required by the
provision. As the I.T.A. does not define the legal concept of a partnership for the purpose of
this or other provisions, the Court looked to the Ontario Partnerships Act[53]and the common
law on which this statute is based to determine whether the disposition qualified for the rollover.
According to Bastarache, J.:
Section 2 of the Partnerships Act defines partnership as "the relation that subsists
between persons carrying on a business in common with a view to profit". This wording,
which is common to the majority of partnership statutes in the common law world,
discloses three essential ingredients: (1) a business, (2) carried on in common, (3) with a
view to profit….
The existence of a partnership is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. It is also determined by what the parties actually intended. As stated in
Lindley & Banks on Partnership (17th ed. 1995), at p. 73: "in determining the
existence of a partnership ... regard must be paid to the true contract and intention of
the parties as appearing from the whole facts of the case".
… In cases such as this, where the parties have entered into a formal written agreement
to govern their relationship and hold themselves out as partners, the courts should
determine whether the agreement contains the type of provisions typically found in a
partnership agreement, whether the agreement was acted upon and whether it actually
governed the affairs of the parties ….[54]
Although concluding that "the parties created a valid partnership within the meaning of s. 2 of
the Partnerships Act",[55] Bastarache J. (dissenting) relied on section 34 of this Act, which
stipulates that a partnership is "dissolved by the happening of any event that makes it unlawful
for the business of the firm to be carried on or for the members of the firm to carry it on in
partnership" to conclude that the partnership was dissolved on account of a prohibition in the
federal Bank Act against banks acquiring or holding an interest in or otherwise investing in a
partnership. Also relying on provincial law, the majority concluded that the Bank Act did not
render the partnership "unlawful" within the meaning of section 34 of the Partnerships Act.[56]
Another example of complementarity between the ITA and the private law of a
province other than Quebec is M.N.R. v. Wardean Drilling Ltd.,[57] in which the taxpayer
sought in computing its income for its 1963 taxation year to deduct capital cost allowance on a
drilling rig purchased in that year under a binding contract, but not delivered until 1964. As
eligibility to claim capital cost allowance turns on the acquisition of the property by the taxpayer,
and the ITA does not define the concept of an acquisition, the Court referred to the Alberta
Sale of Goods Act[58]to determine when the rig was acquired. According to Cattanach J.:
… This appeal was argued by both parties on the assumption that the contracts here in
question are subject to the laws of the Province of Alberta. I think that assumption is
correct. Both parties were resident in Alberta where the contracts were negotiated.
Sections 20 and 21 of the Alberta Sale of Goods Act (R.S.A. 1955, c. 295) outline the
time of transfer of property in goods and rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties
as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer.
Section 20 reads as follows:
20. (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the
property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract
intend it to be transferred.
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the
terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.
Section 21(1) reads as follows:
21. (1) Unless a different intention appears the following are the rules for ascertaining
the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to
the buyer:
Rule I. Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a
deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is
made and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery or both be
postponed.
Rule II. Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods and the seller is bound
to do something to the goods for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the
property does not pass until the thing is done and the buyer has notice thereof....[59]
Relying on evidence indicating that title was to pass "as of date shipment", the Court held that
property did not pass until 1964:
Property in the rig could have passed forthwith had the parties so intended. But the
parties did not so intend. It was agreed, as evidenced by the note on page 5 of the
invoice … that "Title to pass and notes issued as of date shipment". Delivery or
shipment was not until February 18, 1964 and accordingly property in the rig did not
pass to the respondent until that date.
It is my opinion that neither Rule I nor Rule II set forth in Section 21 of The Sale of Goods Act
is applicable to the circumstances of this particular contract but rather that the intention of the
parties as to when property in the rig was to pass is determined by the terms of the contract in
accordance with Section 20 of The Sale of Goods Act.[60]
Similarly, in West Kootenay Power & Light Co. v. The Queen,[61] the Court relied
on provincial sale of goods legislation to determine whether estimated charges for delivered but
unbilled electricity must be included in computing the taxpayer’s income for each of the taxation
years at issue. Referring to sections 31 and 32 of the British Columbia Sale of Goods Act[62]
for the proposition that "[w]here property is sold, delivered and consumed, the rendering of an
account is not a precondition to the right to payment",[63] the Court held that the estimated
revenues were amounts receivable within the meaning of paragraph 12(1)(b) of the ITA which
must be included in computing the taxpayer’s income in each of the years at issue.
Yet another example of complementarity between the ITA and the private law of
contractual relationships is the majority judgment in Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v.
The Queen,[64] which examined the statutory requirement that property be used primarily for
the purpose of "manufacturing or processing goods for sale or lease" in order to qualify for
accelerated capital cost allowance for Class 39 property and investment tax credits under
subsection 127(5) of the ITA.[65] The taxpayer, which operated a paving business, claimed
the benefit of both tax incentives on the grounds that it manufactured asphalt which it sold to
customers in connection with paving services. The Minister reassessed on the basis that the
paving contracts were for the supply of services, not for the sale of goods. Noting that "the
concepts of a sale or a lease have settled legal definitions",[66] Major J. held that the
interpretation of these words in the relevant provisions of the ITA should be governed by their
commercial meaning rather than their ordinary or plain meaning:
... in drafting the manufacturing [or] processing incentives to include reference to sale or
lease, Parliament has chosen to use language that imports relatively fine private law
distinctions. Indeed, the Act is replete with such distinctions. Absent express direction
that an interpretation other than that ascribed by settled commercial law be applied, it
would be inappropriate to do so.
To apply a "plain meaning" interpretation of the concept of a sale in the case at bar would
assume that the Act operates in a vacuum, oblivious to the legal characterization of the broader
commercial relationships it affects. It is not a commercial code in addition to a taxation statute.
Previous jurisprudence of this Court has assumed that reference must be given to the broader
commercial law to give meaning to words that, outside of the Act, are well-defined. See
Continental Bank of Canada v. R., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 298 (S.C.C.). See also P.W. Hogg, J.E.
Magee and T. Cook, Principles of Canadian Tax Law (3rd ed. 1999), at p. 2, where the
authors note:
The Income Tax Act relies implicitly on the general law, especially the law of contract
and property.... Whether a person is an employee, independent contractor, partner,
agent, beneficiary of a trust or shareholder of a corporation will usually have an effect on
tax liability and will turn on concepts contained in the general law, usually provincial
law.[67]
Referring to "common law and sale of goods legislation",[68] which distinguishes between
contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for work and materials,[69] the Court dismissed
the taxpayer’s appeal on the basis that the property in respect of which the taxpayer had
claimed the two tax incentives "was used primarily in the manufacturing or processing of goods
supplied through contracts for work and materials, not through sale."[70]
Turning from the law of contractual relationships to the law of property, courts have also
relied on the private law of provinces other than Quebec in order to determine liability under the
ITA. In Drescher v. The Queen,[71] for example, where the taxpayer argued that interest
income on term deposits should be split with his spouse and daughter on the basis that the term
deposits were purchased with the proceeds of a jointly-acquired lottery ticket, the Court looked
to the private law of Manitoba to determine the appropriate result. According to Muldoon J.:
… the determination of interests in the goods or property is established according to the
law of property (including equity where applicable) of the province in which the goods
or property are located. Manitoban jurisprudence is of persuasive authority here.
Law and equity are both applicable in Manitoba to the determination of property and interest in
a winning ticket leading to property and interest in the prize money and interest generated
thereby.[72]
Rejecting the Minister’s argument, based on Sura, supra, that the income should be attributed
to the legal recipient of the income irrespective of the beneficial ownership of property, the
Court held for the taxpayer on the basis that he had acted as "a trustee of convenience for and
with the knowledge and consent of his wife and their daughter."[73]
Consistent with this decision, other cases in the common law provinces have also relied
on equitable principles in order to attribute income for the purposes of tax. In Feder v.
M.N.R.,[74] for example, where the Minister assessed the taxpayer on the profit from a sale of
land held in his name alone, the Board accepted the taxpayer’s argument that the income should
be split equally with his wife on the basis that half the property was subject to a constructive
trust in her favour.[75] Likewise in Stockman v. The Queen,[76] the Court allowed the
taxpayer to deduct half the rental losses from property, legal title to which was held by her
former husband, on the basis that the former husband held the property subject to a constructive
trust in the taxpayer’s favour. In other cases, the finding of a constructive trust was used to
prevent a deemed disposition at death under subsection 70(5) of the ITA,[77] and to preclude
the application of the attribution rule in former subsection 74(2) on a capital gain from shares
legal title to which was transferred by the taxpayer to his wife.[78] Although taxpayers have
also failed to establish the existence of a constructive or resulting trust on several occasions,[79]
these judgments have uniformly assumed that these equitable principles can be used to
determine the application of various rules under the ITA.[80]
Other decisions have relied on common law property concepts to determine whether property
has been transferred to a spouse or non-arm’s length person in order to trigger the joint and
several liability rule in section 160 of the ITA. In Gardner v. M.N.R.,[81] for example, where
the Minister assessed the taxpayer for tax debts owing by her husband when he executed a quit
claim deed removing his name from title to their jointly-owned residence, the Court allowed the
taxpayer’s appeal on the grounds that the taxpayer was the beneficial owner of the property,
that her husband held legal title solely to enable the taxpayer to obtain mortgage financing, and
that the quit claim merely transferred legal title without affecting beneficial ownership.[82]
Similarly, in Savoie v. The Queen,[83] the Court limited the application of section 160 to half
the value of property transferred to the taxpayer by her husband at a time when he was liable to
pay taxes, on the basis that the property was subject to a constructive or resulting trust in her
favour. In Biderman v. The Queen,[84] moreover, where the taxpayer was indebted to the
revenue authorities at the time of his wife’s death, the Court looked to the common law to
determine whether the taxpayer had effected a valid disclaimer of his inheritance and whether
such a disclaimer could avoid the application of section 160 on the resulting distribution of this
property to his children. Although concluding that the taxpayer had not effected a valid
disclaimer, the Court suggested in obiter that because "a disclaimer operates by way of
avoidance and not by way of disposition"[85] a valid disclaimer would prevent joint and several
liability.[86]
Yet other cases have considered provincial statutes governing succession to property to
determine whether taxpayers have satisfied the statutory requirements to defer tax on
testamentary transfers of property to a spouse or farm property to a child.[87] In Boger Estate
v. The Queen,[88] for example, the Court relied on Alberta’s Devolution of Real Property
Act,[89] to conclude that a beneficial interest in farm property had been "transferred or
distributed" to the taxpayer’s children, as required by subsection 70(9) of the ITA,
notwithstanding that the property was sold by the taxpayer’s estate before its distribution to the
children. Likewise, in Hillis v. The Queen,[90] where the taxpayer died intestate in February
1977, the Federal Court of Appeal considered two Saskatchewan statutes – the Intestate
Succession Act[91] and the Dependants’ Relief Act[92] – to determine when the taxpayer’s
property "vested indefeasibly" in the taxpayer’s spouse for the purpose of the rollover in
subsection 70(6) of the ITA, which at the time required such vesting "within 15 months after the
death of the taxpayer or such longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances".[93]
Although agreeing that the Intestate Succession Act vested $10,000 and one-third of the
residue in the taxpayer’s spouse immediately after the taxpayer’s death, the Court split on the
effect of an order made under the Dependants’ Relief Act in December 1979, with Heald J.
concluding that the Court should respect provincial law giving the order retroactive effect to the
date of the taxpayer’s death,[94] and the other judges holding that the statutory order did not
effect an indefeasible vesting within 15 months.[95] Notwithstanding this conclusion, the
rollover was permitted on the basis that the property vested indefeasibly in the spouse within a
reasonable period of time.[96]
In addition to cases involving the private law of contractual relationships and property, others
have applied a principle of complementarity by relying on provincial statutes governing
corporate law and limitations of actions. In Kalef v. The Queen,[97] for example, the Federal
Court of Appeal referred to the Ontario Business Corporations Act,[98] to determine
whether the taxpayer was subject to section 227.1 of the ITA, which makes directors of a
company that has failed to pay its own taxes or those that it is required to deduct at source
"jointly and severally liable, together with the corporation, to pay that amount and any interest or
penalties related thereto." According to McDonald J.A.:
The Income Tax Act neither defines the term director, nor establishes any criteria for when a
person ceases to hold such a position….
While it may be open to Parliament to expressly deviate from the principles of corporate law for
the purposes of the Income Tax Act, I do not think such an intention should be imputed. Given
the silence of the Income Tax Act I think the guidance of the applicable corporate legislation, in
this case the Ontario Business Corporations Act, should be taken.[99]
Concluding on this basis that the taxpayer continued to occupy the position of a director even
after a trustee in bankruptcy was appointed and took control of the company’s assets to the
exclusion of its directors, the Court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the Minister’s action
was subject to the limitation rule in subsection 227.1(4) of the ITA, which prohibits any action
under subsection 227.1(1) where it is commenced more than two years after the director last
ceased to be a director.
Likewise, in Wheeliker v. The Queen,[100] the Federal Court of Appeal looked to the Nova
Scotia Companies Act[101] to decide whether the taxpayers, who were not de jure directors,
were nonetheless jointly and severally liable under section 227.1 of the ITA on the basis that
they served as de facto directors of a non-profit company that had failed to remit employees’
taxes that it had deducted at source. Echoing the passage from Kalef, supra, quoted earlier,
Noël J.A. (Desjardins J.A. concurring) explained that because the ITA does not define
"director" for the purpose of this provision or the ITA as a whole, "it is therefore appropriate to
look to the Corporation’s incorporating legislation for guidance as to who is a ‘director’ for the
purposes of section 227.1."[102] Although concluding on this basis that de facto directors are
not subject to section 227.1, the Court nonetheless held that the taxpayers were liable under the
common law principle that "a person who has not obtained the requisite qualifications … is
prevented from pleading this failure in order to escape liability attaching to a director".[103]
Concurring in the ultimate outcome, Létourneau J.A. would have included de facto directors
within the scope of section 227.1 on the basis that the absence of any qualification to the word
"director" in the provision suggested that "Parliament intended the word to cover all types of
directors known to the law in company law, including, amongst others, de jure and de facto
directors.[104] Like the majority, however, Létourneau J.A. affirmed the view that, in
determining whether the taxpayers were directors for the purpose of section 227.1 of the ITA, it
was necessary "to look at the body of law which can provide the answer to the silence of the
Act" – namely, the Nova Scotia Companies Act and broader common law principles governing
the characterization of de facto directors.[105]
Yet another example of complementarity with provincial corporate law legislation is the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Dale v. The Queen,[106] in which the Minister disallowed a tax-
deferred transfer of property to a corporation under subsection 85(1) of the I.T.A. on the basis
that the consideration for the property transferred did not include validly issued shares.
Concluding that the invalid issuance of shares had been cured by a subsequent retroactive
declaration of validity under section 44 of the Nova Scotia Companies Act,[107] a majority of
the Court allowed the taxpayer’s appeal. Significantly, the Court emphasized:
If the legislature of a province authorizes its courts to deem something to have occurred on a
date already past, then it is not for the Minister to undermine the legislation by refusing to
recognize the clear effect of the deemed event.[108]
Whether this conclusion is consistent with that of the majority in Hillis, supra, is doubtful.[109]
Finally, in Markevich v. Canada,[110] the Court relied on a six-year limitation period in the
British Columbia Limitation Act[111] to conclude that the revenue authorities could not in
1998 pursue a tax debt that first arose when the Minister issued a Notice of Assessment on
June 17, 1986. Observing that section 222 of the ITA, which declares taxes and other amounts
payable under the ITA to be "debts due to Her Majesty and recoverable as such in the Federal
Court of any other court of competent jurisdiction", is silent on the subject of any limitation
period, the Court referred to section 32 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act[112] to
conclude that the revenue authorities were subject to the applicable provincial limitation period.
More generally, the Court suggested, while the ITA "may exclude application of general legal
principles, rules and remedies", this can only be accomplished by "express language or a
necessary implication to that effect."[113] As section 222 was silent on the subject, it followed
that "Parliament intended the question of limitations to be governed by the laws of general
application."[114] Finally, the Court added, while it might be considered unacceptable to
permit different limitation periods to apply in different provinces, "it is open to Parliament to
amend the Income Tax Act to effect the result it considers appropriate."[115]
2. Dissociation
In contrast to the many cases in which Canadian courts have affirmed or applied a principle of
complementarity between the I.T.A. and provincial private law, others have interpreted various
concepts and provisions in the I.T.A. without regard to the private law of the applicable
province, thereby dissociating these concepts and provisions from the private law rules,
principles and concepts by which they might otherwise be interpreted. This part examines a
number of these concepts and provisions and key judicial decisions in which they have been
subject to interpretation. Although some of these cases dissociate the I.T.A. from the private
law of all provinces, most involve dissociation between the I.T.A. and the civil law of Quebec.
2.1. Gift
The concept of a "gift" appears in several provisions of the I.T.A., the most notable of which
are sections 110.1 and 118.1 granting a deduction or credit for "the fair market value of a gift"
to a qualified donee, and paragraphs 69(1)(b) and (c) deeming property that is transferred "by
way of gift" to have been disposed of by the transferor and acquired by the transferee at fair
market value. As with many other private law concepts on which it relies, the I.T.A. does not
define the word "gift".[116]
In the absence of a statutory definition, one might expect Canadian courts to refer to provincial
private law in order to determine the characteristics of a gift for the purposes of the I.T.A.
Indeed, in common law provinces, courts have generally defined a gift as "a voluntary transfer of
property from one person to another gratuitously and not as the result of a contractual obligation
without anticipation or expectation of material benefit."[117] Although occasionally
characterized as the "ordinary" meaning of the word gift as opposed to a "technical" or legal
interpretation,[118] the judicial and dictionary authorities on which this definition is based
suggest that the source of the concept is in fact the common law of England and the United
States.[119] On this basis, courts in common law provinces have generally disallowed
deductions for charitable contributions where the taxpayer has received any consideration in
return, notwithstanding that the value of the donation exceeded the consideration received.[120]
In Quebec, on the other hand, the concept of a gift set out in the C.C.Q. does not preclude all
consideration, provided that the value of the property conveyed by the gift exceeds the value of
any consideration received in return.[121] On this basis, where a taxpayer sold a farm to his
sons for an amount less than its fair market value, the Tax Appeal Board characterized the
difference as a gift for the purpose of the gift tax in then section 111 of the I.T.A.[122]
Likewise, in Aspinall v. M.N.R.,[123] where the taxpayer purchased tickets to a ballet and
reception for an amount in excess of their fair market value, the Tax Review Board held that the
excess was a gift for the purpose of the charitable contributions deduction.
In The Queen v. Littler,[124] however, where the Minister levied gift tax on a sale of shares to
the taxpayer’s son for an amount less than their fair market value, the Federal Court of Appeal
dissociated the I.T.A. concept of a gift from the civil law of Quebec by adopting the common
law meaning of the word. Rejecting the Minister’s argument that the characteristics of a gift
should be governed by the civil law in Quebec,[125] Jackett C.J. allowed the taxpayer’s appeal
on the basis that the civil law concept of a gift "should not be taken to extend the application of
section 111 of the Income Tax Act in the Province of Quebec beyond what it would be in
another province."[126] On the contrary, he concluded:
A contract of sale, which is, by definition, a transfer of property for a consideration,
cannot be a gift, which is, by definition, a disposition of property without consideration.
…
While, speaking loosely, one might say that a gift was made by way of sale at an
undervaluation (the gift being the benefit so conferred), in my view, the word gift in a
taxing statute must be taken as referring to what is known to the law as a gift, namely,
the gratuitous transfer of property and the difference between value and price is not
"property" and is not something that can be transferred.[127]
In order to achieve uniformity in the application of the I.T.A. throughout Canada, therefore, the
Court effectively ignored the civil law concept of a gift, affirming the common law definition as
the only meaning "known to the law".[128]
Likewise in Gervais v. The Queen,[129] where the taxpayer purchased property including
buildings from his father for less than the property’s fair market value, the Court adopted the
common law meaning of a gift to reject the taxpayer’s argument that the capital cost of the
buildings was deemed to be its fair market value under then paragraph 20(6)(g) of the I.T.A.
[now paragraph 69(1)(c)]. Although acknowledging that the benefit conferred on the taxpayer
by his father might constitute a gift under Quebec law, Walsh J. concluded that:
In the present case we are dealing with a taxing statute which must be applied in the
same manner throughout Canada and as the former Chief Justice Jackett stated, in
dealing with different sections of the Income Tax Act even if the sale at an
undervaluation constituted an indirect gift for the purposes of … the Quebec Civil
Code this should not be taken to extend the application of section 111 of the Income
Tax Act in a litigation in that case in the province of Quebec beyond what it would be in
another province. I believe that the same must apply to the interpretation of paragraph
20(6)(c) of the Act in effect at the time in the present case and that I am governed by
the decision in the Littler case. Although the benefit conferred by the deed of sale
would probably be considered as a gift in Quebec law, for income tax purposes in
which the law must be interpreted consistently throughout Canada, the word "gift" in
paragraph 20(6)(c) of the Act must be given the strict and narrow interpretation given to
it in the Littler case, for income tax purposes.[130]
Here too, therefore, in order to achieve uniformity throughout Canada, the Court dissociated the
I.T.A. concept of a gift from the civil law definition by affirming "for income tax purposes" the
"strict and narrow interpretation" of the common law.
2.2. Charity
According to paragraph 149(1)(f) of the I.T.A., registered charities are exempt from income
tax. In addition to this tax benefit, gifts to registered charities qualify for a deduction in the case
of corporate gifts under section 110.1 of the I.T.A. and a non-refundable credit for individual
gifts under section 118.1.[131] Although the I.T.A. generally defines a "registered charity" as a
charitable organization or foundation,[132] and defines these persons in terms of charitable
activities and purposes,[133] it does not define the term "charitable". The leading case on the
concept of charity for tax purposes is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Vancouver
Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.[134]
For the purposes of this discussion, there is no need to consider the facts of the Vancouver
Society case, except to note that it was yet another in a long line of cases in which the revenue
authorities refused to register the taxpayer as a registered charity on the basis that it did not
qualify under the legal definition of charity adopted by Lord Macnaghton in Commissioners for
Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel,[135] and affirmed in numerous Canadian tax
cases.[136] Although disagreeing over whether the taxpayer’s activities could be characterized
as charitable under the Pemsel test, the Court unanimously approved the relevance of this legal
definition, itself derived from the common law of trusts, on the basis, as Iacobucci J. explained,
that the concept of a "charitable activity" in the I.T.A. "implicitly relies upon the common law for
guidance."[137] According to Gonthier J.:
It is well known that the ITA does not define "charity" or "charitable", other than to
define "charity" to mean "a charitable organization or charitable foundation", which are
themselves defined terms. Instead, as the Federal Court of Appeal stated in Positive
Action Against Pornography v. Ministry of National Revenue, [1988] 2 F.C. 340
(Fed. C.A.) at p. 347, "the Act appears clearly to envisage a resort to the common law
for a definition of "charity" in its legal sense as well as for the principles that should guide
us in applying that definition".[138]
As a result, he concluded, "Parliament has, in effect, incorporated the common law
definition of charity into the ITA …."[139]
As a "common law definition" that applies throughout Canada, the legal concept of charity
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Vancouver Society case is necessarily
dissociated from the private law of Quebec, which recognizes the concept of a "social trust" in
Articles 1266 and 1270 of the C.C.Q,[140] and the concept of a "socially beneficial purpose"
in Article 1256,[141] but does not employ the words "charity" or "charitable". Nor, however,
does this legal definition necessarily correspond to the private law of each common law
province, several of which have adopted statutory definitions of a charitable purpose or a
charity which do not completely correspond to the Pemsel approach.[142] On the contrary, as
Gonthier J. emphasized in the Vancouver Society case, since "the courts have a continuing role
to rationalize and update [the legal] definition [of charity] to keep it in tune with social and
economic developments … the definition of "charity" or "charitable" under the ITA may not
accord precisely with the way those terms are understood in the common law provinces, due to
judicial decisions and provincial statutory incursions into the common law."[143] Thus, he
concluded, the "conception of charity" in the I.T.A. is "uniform federal law across the
country."[144]
2.3. Employee / independent contractor
The distinction between employees and independent contractors is among the most important
for federal income taxation,[145] resulting in significant differences in the computation of
income,[146] in the application of the tax to non-residents,[147] and in administrative
arrangements for the payment of income tax.[148] In contrast to the words "gift" and
"charitable", the I.T.A. defines "employment" as "the position of an individual in the service of
some other person" and "employee" as "a person holding such a position".[149] A "business",
on the other hand, is defined to include "a profession, calling, trade, manufacture or undertaking
of any kind whatever", and except for specific purposes "an adventure or concern in the nature
of trade", but not an office or employment.[150] As the language of these statutory definitions
is quite general, however, Canadian courts have developed a number of tests to distinguish
between employees and independent contractors.[151] The leading case on the concept of
employment for tax purposes is Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. M.N.R.[152]
In Wiebe Door, the taxpayer carried on a business of installing and repairing overhead doors in
Calgary, in the course of which services were performed for the taxpayer by "a considerable
number of door installers and repairers, each of whom [had] a specific understanding that they
would be running their own businesses and would therefore be responsible for their own taxes
…."[153] At trial,[154] the Tax Court considered four tests by which Canadian courts "most
commonly" distinguish between employees and independent contractors, dismissing the
traditional "control" test as "indecisive" on the facts of the case,[155] concluding that "the
workers would seem to be independent contractors" under tests considering the ownership of
tools and the chance of profit and risk of loss,[156] but ultimately holding that the workers were
employees on the basis of the so-called "integration" test.[157] According to the trial judge:
The Appellant was in the business of servicing and installing overhead electronically controlled
doors. All the work performed by the installers formed an integral part of the Appellant’s
business. Without the installers, the Appellant would be out of business…. In the case before
me, this test tips the scales in favour of a contract of service and not a contract for
services.[158]
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal set aside the decision and referred the matter back to
the Tax Court on the basis that it had misapplied the integration test by approaching the test
from the perspective of the "employer" rather than the "employee".[159] More generally, the
Court affirmed a general test, "weighing all of the relevant factors,"[160] including control,
ownership of tools, chance of profit and risk of loss, as well as integration,[161] in order to
evaluate "the total relationship of the parties".[162] This general test has been affirmed in
several subsequent income tax cases,[163] and more recently by the Supreme Court of Canada
in a case involving vicarious liability in tort law.[164]
For the purpose of this discussion, the general test affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in
Wiebe Door is of less importance than the sources of the various subordinate tests to which the
general test refers. For the control test, the Court cites the "traditional common-law criterion of
the employment relationship" established by Baron Bramwell in R. v. Walker,[165] according
to whom:
… the difference between the relations of master and servant and of principal and agent
is this: A principal has the right to direct what the agent has to do; but a master has not
only that right, but also the right to say how it is to be done.[166]
For the so-called "economic reality" or "entrepreneur" test, which considers both the ownership
of tools and the chance of profit and the risk of loss in addition to the criterion of control, the
Court cites an article by William O. (later Justice) Douglas on vicarious liability in tort law,[167]
and a decision in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council relied on common law
principles to conclude that the respondent was not liable for municipal taxes on the basis that it
carried on its operations as an agent of the Crown.[168] For the integration or "organization"
test, the Court cites Denning L.J.’s judgment in Stevenson Jordan and Harrison, Ltd. v.
MacDonald and Evans,[169] which considered the common law distinction between a
contract of service and a contract for services in order to determine the ownership of a
manuscript for the purpose of the English Copyright Act.[170] As a result, each of the
subordinate tests to which the Court refers in Wiebe Door derives from the common law.
In contrast to these common law tests, the civil law has consistently emphasized control
or subordination as the main or sole criterion for distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors. In Québec Asbestos Corporation v. Couture,[171] for example, in
which the respondent sought damages for injuries suffered from an explosion in the course of his
work, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the control test alone to conclude that the
appellant company was not liable on the basis that the respondent was an independent
contractor. According to Rinfret J.:
[TRANSLATION] A contract of employment differs from a contract of enterprise
above all by the characteristic of subordination attributable to the employee.
…
Couture carried out his work in an independent manner, without the direction and
control of the company.[172]
Although the Québec Asbestos case was decided in 1928, the emphasis on control or
subordination was reaffirmed in several more recent decisions.[173] More importantly, while
the Civil Code of Lower Canada did not itself define control or subordination as the key test
to distinguish employees and independent contractors, this factor is central to the new C.C.Q.
which came into force on January 1, 1994. According to Article 2085 of the C.C.Q.:
A contract of employment is a contract by which a person, the employee, undertakes for a
limited period to do work for remuneration, according to the instructions and under the direction
or control of another person, the employer.
According to Articles 2098 and 2099, on the other hand:
A contract of enterprise or for services is a contract by which a person, the contractor
of the provider of services, as the case may be, undertakes to carry out physical or
intellectual work for another person, the client or to provide a service, for a price which
the client binds himself to pay.
The contractor or the provider of services is free to choose the means of performing the
contract and no relationship of subordination exists between the contractor or the provider of
services and the client in respect of such performance.
In Quebec’s civil law system, therefore, control or subordination is the key criterion by which
employees are distinguished from independent contractors.
Notwithstanding the civil law, however, Canadian income tax cases in the province of Quebec
have generally applied the same tests to distinguish employees and independent contractors as
the courts in the common law provinces apply, thereby dissociating the meaning of these
concepts for tax purposes from their meaning under Quebec’s civil law. In Hauser v.
M.N.R.,[174] for example, a case which preceded the Federal Court of Appeal decision in
Wiebe Door, the Tax Review Board made no mention of the civil law, but applied the control
test, the integration test, the economic reality test, and another test looking at the work to be
performed under the contract,[175] to conclude that the taxpayer was an employee not an
independent contractor. A similar approach was adopted in two subsequent tax cases, each of
which also preceded Wiebe Door.[176] In yet another case decided before Wiebe
Door,[177] the Tax Review Board mentioned the civil law, but considered a number of criteria
including ownership of tools, chance of profit and risk of loss, and integration, on the basis that
the various tests "expressed by doctrine and by numerous judgments in civil law, in common law
and tax law … are all the same."[178]
Since Wiebe Door, Canadian income tax cases in the province of Quebec have tended to apply
the general test adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal, considering each of the subordinate
tests to which it referred in order to evaluate "the total relationship of the parties".[179] In
Tedco Apparel Management Services Inc. v. M.N.R.,[180] for example, the Court rejected
the taxpayer’s argument that the control or subordination test should be given priority in Quebec
on the basis that "in Quebec as in the other provinces of Canada further developments have
deprived this test of its conclusive effect."[181] Similarly, in Wolf v. The Queen,[182] although
citing the provisions of the new C.C.Q., Desjardins J.A. relies on the various subordinate tests
considered in Wiebe Door, on the basis that "the distinction between a contract of employment
and a contract for services under the Civil Code of Québec can be examined in light of the
tests developed through the years both in the civil law and in the common law."[183] In
contrast, while recognizing that both the civil and common law look to "the terms of the relevant
agreements and circumstances to find the true contractual reality of the parties",[184] Décary
J.A.’s concurring judgment in Wolf v. The Queen emphasizes that for tax cases arising in
Quebec "[t]he test … is whether, looking at the total relationship of the parties, there is control
on the one hand and subordination on the other."[185] As a result, he observes of Desjardins
J.A.’s judgment:
I find it somehow puzzling that ‘control’ is listed amongst the factors to be considered in an
exercise the purpose of which is precisely, under the Civil Code of Quebec, to determine
whether or not there is control.[186]
At least one other case has adopted a similar approach, concluding that in Quebec the
characterization of an employment relationship for the purpose of the federal Employment
Insurance Act should be based on the C.C.Q.[187]
2.4. Residence
Like the concept of employment, the concept of residence is among the most important in the
I.T.A., governing each person’s basic liability for tax under subsection 2(1),[188] the
application of taxes on non-residents under subsection 2(3) and Part XIII of the I.T.A.,[189]
and numerous other rules governing the computation of a taxpayer’s income.[190] While the
I.T.A. defines "a reference to a person resident in Canada" to include "a person who was at the
relevant time ordinarily resident in Canada",[191] and contains specific rules deeming certain
persons "to have been resident in Canada throughout a taxation year"[192] and others to not be
resident in Canada,[193] it does not define the concept of "residence" itself. Nor do Canada’s
international tax treaties define this concept, stipulating instead that the term "resident of a
Contracting State" is generally determined according to the domestic law of the applicable
State.[194] In the absence of any such authoritative definition, therefore, the meaning of
residence under the I.T.A. has been defined by the courts, which have developed principles and
guidelines to determine the residence of individuals, trusts and corporations. For the purpose of
this discussion, the key issue concerns the concept of individual residence.
In Canada, the leading case on the concept of individual residence is Thomson v. M.N.R.,[195]
in which a Canadian citizen who left Canada in 1923 and spent most of the year in the United
States thereafter, returned to Canada for several months each summer from 1932 to 1941,
renting a house during the summers of 1932 to 1934 and building a house in 1934 where his
wife resided on a year-round basis. Dismissing the taxpayer’s appeal from an assessment
imposing Canadian income tax on his worldwide income, a majority of the Court held that the
taxpayer was during his 1940 taxation year "residing or ordinarily resident in Canada" within the
meaning of then paragraph 9(a) of the Income War Tax Act.[196] More importantly, for
Canadian income tax law, the Court considered the concepts of "residence" and "ordinary
residence" in order to apply the statutory provision.
Although the decision is complicated by five separate opinions, one of these in dissent,
the majority judgments share three important characteristics. First, all but one cite English tax
cases interpreting the concepts "resident" and "ordinarily resident" in the context of the U.K.
Income Tax Act, 1918.[197] In the most important of these cases,[198] the House of Lords
held that these words had "no technical or special meaning",[199] were used in their ordinary or
"common sense",[200] and involved questions of "fact and degree … determined on all the
circumstances of the case."[201] According to Viscount Cave L.C.:
… the word "reside" is a familiar English word and is defined in the Oxford English
Dictionary as meaning "to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one’s
settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular place."[202]
According to Lord Buckmaster:
… if residence be once established ordinarily resident means … no more than that the
residence is not casual and uncertain but that the person held to reside does so in the
ordinary course of his life.[203]
Adopting a similar understanding of the expression "ordinary residence" as "residence in a place
with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences",[204]
Viscount Cave L.C. also observed that the concept "differs little in meaning" from the concept
of residence alone.[205]
Second, consistent with the English cases, the majority judgments in Thomson conclude that for
Canadian tax purposes as well the words "resident" and "ordinarily resident" have no special or
technical meaning, but "should receive the meaning ascribed to them by common usage."[206]
Referring to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, for example, Kerwin, J. interprets the word
"reside" as:
To dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one's settled or usual abode,
to live, in or at a particular place.[207]
and the word "ordinarily" as
1. In conformity with rule; as a matter of regular occurrence. 2. In most cases, usually,
commonly. 3. To the usual extent. 4. As is normal or usual.[208]
Likewise, Kellock, J. cites Murray’s New English Dictionary to interpret the word "reside" as
"to take up one’s abode or station,’ "to dwell permanently for a considerable time," "to have
one’s settled or usual abode," and "to live in or at a particular place",[209] while Estey, J. refers
to "dictionary and judicial comments" to conclude that "one is ‘ordinarily resident’ in the place
where in the settled routine of his life he regularly, normally or customarily lives."[210]
Finally, and also consistent with the English cases, the majority judgments in Thomson hold that
the assessment of an individual’s residence is mostly factual in nature, requiring that "all of the
relevant factors" be "taken into consideration".[211] According to Rand, J., for example:
The gradation of degrees of time, object, intention, continuity and other relevant
circumstances, shows … that in common parlance "residing" is not a term of invariable
elements, all of which must be satisfied in each instance. It is quite impossible to give it a
precise and inclusive definition. It is highly flexible, and its many shades of meaning vary
not only in the contexts of different matters, but also in different aspects of the same
matter. In one case it is satisfied by certain elements, in another by others, some
common, some new.[212]
As a result, he concludes, the characterization of an individual’s residence is "chiefly a matter of
the degree to which a person in mind and fact settles into or maintains or centralizes his ordinary
mode of living with its accessories in social relations, interests and conveniences at or in the
place in question."[213]
For present purposes, the specific interpretations of the words residence and ordinary residence
in Thomson are less important than the sources to which the majority judgments refer to
support their interpretations. In contrast to the concepts of charity, gift and employment that
Canadian courts have adopted for tax purposes, these interpretations of the words residence
and ordinary residence originate not in common law concepts or principles, such as those
governing an individual’s domicile,[214] but in the ordinary meaning of the words found in
dictionary definitions and "common parlance".[215] As a result, although commentators often
refer to the "common law" meaning of residence in order to distinguish this concept from
statutory deeming rules,[216] the tax concepts of residence and ordinary residence are
unrelated to the common law that governs relationships between private persons. For the same
reason, these concepts are also unconnected to the civil law of Quebec which, like the common
law, employs the concept of residence in order to define a person’s domicile,[217] or to the
definitions of the word "resident" in the statutes of many common law provinces.[218] In each
case, therefore, the tax concepts of residence and ordinary residence are dissociated from
provincial private law.[219]
2.5. Acquisition and disposition of property
Another notable example of dissociation between the I.T.A. and provincial private law involves
the related concepts of an acquisition of property and a disposition of property.[220] For tax
purposes, an acquisition of property is relevant to the characterization of "depreciable property"
under subsection 13(21) of the I.T.A.,[221] upon which the right to deduct capital cost
allowances is based. The concept of a disposition, on the other hand, affects the timing of tax
consequences, triggering the recognition of gains and losses on the property disposed of.[222]
Although the I.T.A. does not define the words "acquire" or "acquisition", it contains a lengthy
definition of the word "disposition" to include among other things "any transaction or event
entitling a taxpayer to proceeds of disposition of the property" and to exclude various kinds of
transfers "as a consequence of which there is no change in the beneficial ownership of the
property".[223] In addition to this definition, the I.T.A. defines the expression "proceeds of
disposition" to include "the sale price of property that has been sold" and various kinds of
compensation for property unlawfully taken, destroyed, taken under statutory authority,
injuriously affected, or damaged.[224] In applying statutory provisions governing the timing of
inclusions and deductions, Canadian courts have often considered when or whether taxpayers
have acquired or disposed of property.
In common law provinces, the leading case on the concept of an acquisition of property is
Wardean Drilling,[225] which was reviewed earlier as an example of complementarity
between the I.T.A. and the private law of provinces other than Quebec.[226] Referring to
provisions of the Alberta Sale of Goods Act,[227] the Court held that the taxpayer had not
acquired a drilling rig in the taxation year before the year in which it was delivered on the basis
that the contract stipulated that title was not to pass until shipment. More generally, Cattanach
J. concluded, property could be acquired for tax purposes either "when title has passed,
assuming that the assets exist at that time" or "when the purchaser has all the incidents of title,
such as possession, use and risk, although legal title may remain in the vendor as security for the
purchase price as is the commercial practice under conditional sales agreements."[228]
Subsequent cases in common law provinces have consistently followed this interpretation of an
acquisition of property,[229] considering not only the legal ownership of property represented
by the transfer of title but also the beneficial ownership of property represented by "the incidents
of title, such as possession, use and risk".[230]
Consistent with this approach to the acquisition of property, cases in common law provinces
have also looked to the beneficial ownership of property in order to characterize a disposition of
property. In Victory Hotels Ltd. v. M.N.R.,[231] for example, the Court suggested that the
words "disposed of" should be given "their widest meaning which would be ‘to part with’, ‘to
pass over the control of the thing to someone else’ so that the person disposing no longer has
the use of the property."[232] On this basis, it concluded that the taxpayer, who sold a hotel in
December 1954 with occupancy on January 3, 1955, had not disposed of the property until
1955. Similarly, in Kozan v. M.N.R.,[233] where the taxpayer entered into an agreement to
sell an apartment building in 1979, but was unable to close until 1980, the Court relied on the
fact that the purchaser assumed "[f]ull possession and use" of the property in 1979 to conclude
that the property was disposed of in that year.[234] In other cases, courts have held that
taxpayers who have leased property under a lease-purchase agreement have retained sufficient
"incidents of ownership" to preclude a disposition of the property until the end of the
lease.[235]
Unlike the common law, Quebec’s civil law system does not distinguish between legal and
beneficial ownership but generally regards ownership as absolute. To the extent that courts rely
on provincial private law to interpret the I.T.A., therefore, tax cases in Quebec might be
expected to require a transfer of title to trigger an acquisition or disposition of property. Indeed,
in a number of cases involving transactions in Quebec, courts disallowed the deduction of
capital cost allowances claimed by purchasers under conditional sales agreements on the basis
that they did not acquire title to the property which remained with the vendor.[236] In contrast,
in Olympia & York Developments,[237] the Court effectively dissociated the meaning of a
disposition from the private law of Quebec by interpreting the concept in accordance with the
concept of an acquisition set out in Wardean Drilling,[238] on the basis that the concept of a
disposition is "obviously the direct opposite" of an acquisition.[239] As a result, it concluded,
the taxpayer, which conveyed property to a purchaser in 1969 pursuant to a sales agreement
delaying transfer of title until 1974, had disposed of the property in 1969 when it "completely
divested itself of all of the duties, responsibilities and charges of ownership and also all of the
profits, benefits and incidents of ownership, except legal title."[240] Other cases in Quebec
have generally followed this approach, concluding that taxpayers have disposed of property
under conditional sales agreements when they relinquish "the normal incidents of title … such as
possession, use and risk" while nonetheless retaining legal ownership until the purchase price is
fully paid.[241]
In Construction Bérou Inc. v. The Queen,[242] moreover, a majority of the Federal Court of
Appeal reconsidered the concept of an acquisition in Quebec, affirming the meaning adopted in
Wardean Drilling on the grounds that Parliament intended the concepts of an acquisition and a
disposition of property to apply uniformly throughout Canada by incorporating the common law
distinction between legal and beneficial ownership both in the statutory definition of a
disposition,[243] and in subsection 248(3) of the I.T.A. which deems the civil law concepts of
usufruct, right of use or habitation, and substitution to be a trust, and all rights under these
arrangements to be beneficial interests. According to Desjardins J.A.:
The federal Parliament … devised, for tax purposes and for all of Canada, a common concept
covering the ideas of "disposition" ("disposition de biens") and "beneficial ownership"
("propriété effective"), both in civil and common law: the corollary of these provisions being that
when there was a "disposition" for a party to a contract the other party made an "acquisition" or
obtained the "beneficial ownership" of it.[244]
Consequently, Létourneau J.A. concluded, "disposition or acquisition of property for purposes
of capital cost allowance exists under the Act when the normal incidents of title such as
possession, use and risk are transferred."[245] As a result, it follows, the concept of an
acquisition, like that of a disposition, has been dissociated from the civil law of Quebec.
2.6. Other cases
In addition to cases interpreting the concepts of charity, gift, employment, residence, and the
acquisition and disposition of property, other cases have dissociated the interpretation of the
I.T.A. from provincial private law in various other contexts. In Jacoby v. M.N.R.,[246] for
example, in which the taxpayer made payments to his wife pursuant to a written separation
agreement which she had neither signed nor initialled, the Tax Review Board disallowed the
deduction of these payments under paragraph 60(b) of the I.T.A. on the basis that they were
not payable pursuant to a "written agreement" within the meaning of the provision,[247]
notwithstanding its conclusion that the document was a "valid written agreement" under both the
civil law and the common law according to which consent to an agreement may be express or
implied.[248] Observing that deductible payments must, under the I.T.A., be made either under
the order of a competent tribunal or under a written agreement, the Board reasoned that "it is
rather difficult to conclude that the legislature did not mean that the contract should not be
signed."[249] As a result, it concluded, "the consent which is the specific element of the
contract must also be in writing."[250] Although other cases have held that both parties need
not sign the same document for it to constitute a "written agreement" within the meaning of the
I.T.A.,[251] the requirement in Jacoby that consent must be in writing has been consistently
affirmed.[252] As a result, it follows, these decisions have dissociated the concept of a "written
agreement" from provincial private law.
Similarly, in Démolition A.M. de l’Est Du Québec Inc. v. M.N.R.,[253] where the
Minister disallowed the taxpayer’s deduction for manufacturing or processing profits under
section 125.1 of the I.T.A., the Court rejected the Minister’s argument that the taxpayer’s
demolition business should, under Quebec law, be characterized as "construction" which is not
eligible for the deduction,[254] on the basis that the word construction should be interpreted
according to its "ordinary meaning".[255] According to Garon, T.C.C.J.:
… provisions of the Civil Code, assuming that they operate to treat demolition work on
the same basis as construction activity, can be of no assistance when it comes to
interpreting a federal tax statute dealing with the scope of the manufacturing and
processing profits tax credit. It is of no relevance that the demolition industry in Quebec
is governed by the Office de la construction du Québec, which was established under a
provincial statute. It follows that this exception [for construction], which appears in
subparagraph 125.1(3)(b)(iii) of the Income Tax Act [now paragraph (c) of the
definition of "manufacturing or processing" in subsection 125.1(3)], must be interpreted
solely in the context of that Act. The interpretation cannot be determined by provincial
statutes which may vary from one province to another in respect of the same subject
and thus treat demolition businesses and related activities differently.[256]
For the purpose of the manufacturing and processing deduction, therefore, this decision
dissociated the meaning of the word "construction" from its meaning under provincial law.
A final example of dissociation between the I.T.A. and provincial private law is the Federal
Court of Appeal decision in Marcoux v. Canada,[257] in which a tax debtor relied on Article
553(7) of Quebec’s Code of Civil Procedure, which exempts from garnishment proceedings
"[b]enefits payable under a supplemental pension plan to which an employer contributes on
behalf of employees", to challenge the Minister’s garnishment of pension income under
subsection 224(1) of the I.T.A.[258] Since this provision does not exclude provincial law, the
taxpayer maintained, the Code of Civil Procedure should be applied as a supplement to the
federal law. At trial,[259] the Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal on the basis that
subsection 224(1) was a "complete code".[260] According to Denault J.:
In the interests of the uniform application of this federal statute and the equality of taxpayers
before the taxation authorities, I am of the opinion that Parliament, under subsection 224(1) of
the Income Tax Act, has created a unique mechanism that gives its provision a genuine self-
sufficiency in relation to private law.[261]
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal characterized the issue as one of "statutory
construction",[262] and cited subsection 225(5) of the I.T.A., which exempts from seizure
under subsection 225(1) "[s]uch goods and chattels of any person in default as would be
exempt from seizure under a writ of execution issued out of a superior court of the province in
which the seizure is made", to conclude that Parliament did not intend to permit any provincial
exemption to the garnishment rule in subsection 224(1). According to Nöel, J.A.:
Section 224, when read with s. 225, shows that in creating the methods of seizure mentioned in
those sections Parliament had in mind the exemptions from seizure enacted in private law, and
chose to take them into account in s. 225 and not take then into account in s. 224.[263]
In contrast to the decision in Markevich,[264] therefore, where the Federal Court of Appeal
interpreted legislative silence regarding limitations for tax debts to require reference to provincial
private law, the Court in Marcoux concluded that "Parliament has spoken on the point at
issue."[265]
3. Canadian Bijuralism and the Federal Income tax act
As explained in the introduction to this paper, "bijuralism" is defined narrowly as "the
coexistence of two legal traditions within a single state" and more broadly as "the sharing of
values and traditions" associated with each of the two legal traditions.[266] In Canada,
bijuralism of the first kind may be traced to the Quebec Act of 1774,[267] which provided that
French law would apply to matters of property and civil rights in the Province of Quebec, and
was secured by subsection 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which granted exclusive
authority to provincial governments to make laws in relation to "Property and Civil Rights".
Bijuralism of the second kind is more elusive and aspirational, but finds expression both in
federal policies and enactments and in the evolving jurisprudence of Canadian courts.[268]
This part examines the aims of Canadian bijuralism, and its implications for the interpretation and
amendment of the I.T.A. Section 3.1 reviews the aims of Canadian bijuralism as expressed in
the Policy on Legislative Bijuralism adopted by the federal Department of Justice in June 1995,
the Preamble to the Federal Law - Civil Law Harmonization Act, and recent amendments to
the federal Interpretation Act. Section 3.2 considers the implications of these developments
for the interpretation and amendment of the I.T.A.
3.1. Canadian Bijuralism
While bijuralism narrowly defined has existed in Canada since the Quebec Act of 1774,
recognition of the civil law tradition at the federal level is a relatively recent development. Until
the 1970s, for example, federal legislation was typically drafted by English-speaking lawyers
trained in the common law, and translated into French by translators with little or no legal
training, with "makeshift" adjustments made to accommodate the interaction of this legislation
and the civil law of Quebec.[269] Correspondingly, Supreme Court of Canada decisions
routinely ignored the distinctive character of the civil law of Quebec, interpreting provisions of
the Civil Code of Lower Canada in light of English authorities and common law
concepts.[270]
With the development of official bilingualism and biculturalism at the federal level in the 1960s
and 1970s, these unijural approaches to legislative drafting and judicial decision-making became
increasingly anachronistic and unacceptable. In 1975, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly
recognized the Civil Code of Lower Canada as "radically different" from the common law, the
provisions of which "must be interpreted in keeping with the whole of which it is a part."[271]
Over the next few years, the Court established the basis for a complementary relationship
between federal legislation and provincial private law through a series of decisions interpreting
the words "Laws of Canada" for the purpose of section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to
require a federal statutory text.[272] Most importantly, perhaps, in 1978 the federal
Department of Justice introduced a new method of drafting federal legislation, called
"codrafting", whereby all bills drafted by the Legislative Services Branch are prepared by two
drafters – a francophone who is typically trained in civil law, and an anglophone who is usually
trained in the common law.[273]
Although bijural, this method of codrafting did not directly speak to Francophone common law
lawyers nor Anglophone civil law lawyers. Nor did the new approach make bijuralism an
explicit objective of the codrafting process. In June 1995, therefore, the Department of Justice
adopted an explicit Policy on Legislative Bijuralism, intended to provide Canadians with "federal
legislative texts that will reflect, in each linguistic version, the legal system in use in their
province."[274] According to this policy, the Department of Justice:
a) formally recognizes that it is imperative that the four Canadian legal audiences (Francophone
civil law lawyers, Francophone common law lawyers, Anglophone civil law lawyers and
Anglophone common law lawyers) may, on the one hand, read federal statutes and regulations
in the official language of their choice and, on the other, be able to find in them terminology and
wording that are respectful of the concepts, notions and institutions proper to the legal system
(civil or common law) of their province or territory;
b) will undertake, in drafting both versions of every bill and proposed regulation that touches on
provincial or territorial private law, to take care to reflect the terminology, concepts, notions and
institutions of both of Canada’s private law systems; [and]
c) charges the Legislative Services Branch with the mandate of seeing to the respect and the
implementation of legislative bijuralism, in bills as well as in proposed regulations.[275]
In general, therefore, this policy is designed to promote equal access to justice by different legal
and linguistic communities in Canada, equal recognition of the civil and common law traditions in
federal legislation, and a harmonious relationship between federal legislative objectives and these
legal traditions.[276]
Given the historical dominance of common law concepts and principles in federal legislation,
moreover, an important objective of this policy was also to ensure that federal legislation not
"treat Quebec civil law as an inferior or subsidiary component of the Canadian legal
tradition."[277]
Three years after the adoption of this policy on legislative bijuralism, the federal government
introduced Bill C-50,[278] containing amendments to various federal statutes relating to
provincial private law,[279] as well as the federal Interpretation Act.[280] Although Bill C-50
died on the Order Paper when the House was prorogued, and a subsequent version, Bill S-
22,[281] died when Parliament dissolved in the autumn of 2000, the Bill was re-tabled at the
opening of the subsequent Parliamentary session as Bill S-4,[282] enacted into law as the
Federal Law – Civil Law Harmonization Act,[283] and proclaimed in force on June 1,
2001.[284] According to the Preamble to this legislation:
… all Canadians are entitled to access to federal legislation in keeping with the common
law and civil law traditions;
… the civil law tradition of the Province of Quebec, which finds its principal expression
in the Civil Code of Québec, reflects the unique character of Quebec society;
… the harmonious interaction of federal and provincial legislation is essential and lies in
an interpretation of federal legislation that is compatible with the common law or civil
law traditions, as the case may be;
… the full development of our two major legal traditions gives Canadians a window on
the world and facilitates exchanges with the vast majority of other countries;
… the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is the law that completes
federal legislation when applied in a province, unless otherwise provided by law; [and]
… the objective of the Government of Canada is to facilitate access to federal
legislation that takes into account the common law and civil law traditions, in its English
and French versions ….
In addition to restating the basic goals underlying the Department of Justice Policy on Legislative
Bijuralism, therefore, this Preamble affirms a principle of complementarity between federal
legislation and provincial private law.
For the purpose of this discussion, there is no need to consider the Federal Law – Civil Law
Harmonization Act in detail, most of which addresses the law of property, security interests,
and civil liability. Although the statute does not address the I.T.A. directly, however, it does so
indirectly through amendments to the federal Interpretation Act, which merit specific
examination.[285] According to new section 8.1 of this statute:
Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of the
law of property and civil rights in Canada and, unless otherwise provided by law, if in
interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts
forming part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the rules,
principles or concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied.
According to new section 8.2:
Unless otherwise provided by law, when an enactment contains both civil law and
common law terminology, or terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and
the common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the Province
of Quebec and the common law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the other
provinces.
In general, section 8.1 recognizes the equal status of common law and civil law as "sources of
the law of property and civil rights in Canada", affirms complementarity as the appropriate
approach to the interpretation of federal legislation relating to provincial private law, and
establishes an ambulatory principle according to which the relevant provincial private law is
stipulated to be that "in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied."
Significantly, however, the complementarity principle applies only "if in interpreting an
enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of
the law of property and civil rights" [emphasis added], and does not apply where it is
"otherwise provided by law". In practice, of course, each of these conditions is itself a matter
of statutory interpretation. For this purpose, however, courts should presumably refer to the
aims and principles underlying Canadian bijuralism, particularly those expressed in the Preamble
to the Federal Law – Civil Law Harmonization Act.[286]
Beginning with the first condition, that it must be "necessary to refer to a province’s rules,
principles or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights" to interpret the
enactment, this would seem to be satisfied where the enactment relies on or employs a concept
with an established private law meaning that is not defined in federal legislation, relies on private
law rules or principles to define the legal relationships to which it applies, or is silent on a matter
that is governed by a specific provincial rule forming part of the law of property and civil rights.
Since the enactment cannot be applied without relying on the private law rules, principles or
concepts, it follows that it is "necessary to refer to … rules, principles or concepts forming part
of the law of property and civil rights" to interpret the enactment.[287] Since the Constitution
Act, 1867 grants provincial governments exclusive authority to make laws in relation to property
and civil rights, moreover, the interpretation of the enactment must, unless it is otherwise
provided by law, refer to "a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law or
property or civil rights". Conversely, it is not necessary to refer to provincial private law to
interpret concepts that are fully defined in federal legislation, statutory provisions that do not
depend on "rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law of property or civil rights", and
legislation that explicitly precludes reliance on provincial private law.[288]
As for the second condition, which precludes what would otherwise be a necessary reference to
provincial private law to interpret a federal enactment where it is "otherwise provided by law",
this exclusion is clearly satisfied where the federal enactment explicitly dissociates the
interpretation of a concept or provision from provincial private law.[289] More difficult,
however, are circumstances in which dissociation from provincial private law is implicit in the
language or purposes of the statutory text. Where federal legislation relies on common law
terms, for example, a necessary implication may be raised that its interpretation must be based
on common law principles and dissociated from the civil law of Quebec.[290] In the context of
much federal legislation, moreover, it is often a reasonable presumption that Parliament intends
that its laws should apply uniformly throughout Canada,[291] particularly in the area of taxation
where equity and anti-avoidance considerations can weigh so heavily.[292] As a result, some
might argue, undefined private law concepts in federal legislation should be given their common
law meanings in order to ensure conceptual coherence and uniformity throughout Canada.
Although the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty requires the courts to dissociate the
interpretation of federal legislation from the private law of one or more provinces where
Parliament’s intention is clear, the goals of Canadian bijuralism suggest that this should be done
only when this intention is stated explicitly or necessarily implied by the language of the statutory
text.[293] As Rod Macdonald explains, "forcing Parliament itself to make its choices explicitly
is the best guarantee that the distinctive civil law and common law traditions in Canada will be
respected in any legislative reordering."[294] Nor, of course, should judicial precedents be
regarded as "law" within the meaning of the exclusion in new section 8.1 of the federal
Interpretation Act, since this would render the provision largely meaningless. For this reason,
moreover, it might be clearer to amend the provision to read "unless otherwise provided in
federal legislation".
In contrast to new section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, section 8.2 is relatively
straightforward, stipulating that federal legislation using civil law and common law terminology
"must be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the legal system of the province in which the
provision is being applied."[295] As a guide to the interpretation of bijural legislation, this
provision is intended to preclude the application of common law concepts in Quebec and civil
law concepts in the common law provinces.
3.2. Implications for the Income tax act
Although most of the amendments introduced by the Federal Law – Civil Law
Harmonization Act involve federal statutes relating to the law of property, security interests
and civil liability, the Preamble to this legislation and new section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act
have important implications for the interpretation of the I.T.A., calling into question a number of
the cases examined earlier in which courts have dissociated the interpretation of specific
concepts or provisions from provincial private law. In turn, these developments and the
Department of Justice Policy on Legislative Bijuralism have important implications for the
amendment of the I.T.A. in order to ensure that federal objectives are achieved in a manner that
is consistent with equal recognition of the civil and common law traditions and complementarity
between federal legislation and provincial private law. This section considers both sets of
implications, examining the impact of Canadian bijuralism on the interpretation of the I.T.A. and
the amendment of specific concepts and provisions.
3.2.1. Interpretation
In order to interpret the I.T.A., Canadian courts have tended to refer to provincial private law in
three circumstances. First, where the I.T.A. employs a concept with an established private law
meaning without specifically defining the concept for the purposes of the I.T.A., courts have
generally turned to provincial private law in order to define its meaning. In Continental
Bank,[296] for example, the Supreme Court of Canada looked to the common law and the
Ontario Partnerships Act to determine whether the taxpayer had entered into a valid
partnership for the purpose of the rollover rule in subsection 97(2) of the I.T.A. In Quebec, on
the other hand, courts have looked to the civil law to determine the meaning of a partnership for
the purpose of the I.T.A.[297] In other cases, courts have referred to provincial private law to
determine the meaning of a director for the purpose of the liability rule in section 227.1 of the
I.T.A.,[298] and the meaning of the expression "goods for sale" for the purpose of I.T.A. rules
governing accelerated capital cost allowance and investment tax credits.[299] In each of these
cases, courts have relied on provincial private law as a kind of "legislative dictionary" to supply
the meaning of an otherwise undefined term for the purpose of the I.T.A.[300]
Second, where the application of a specific provision depends on legal rights and obligations
that are not defined in federal legislation, courts have relied on the private law rules and
principles by which these rights and obligations are established in order to apply the provision.
In Drescher v. The Queen,[301] for example, the Court looked to the law of property in
Manitoba to determine whether interest income from term deposits purchased with the
proceeds of a jointly-acquired lottery ticket should be allocated equally among the taxpayer, his
spouse, and his daughter, or taxable in the hands of the taxpayer alone. Likewise, in other
common law provinces as well as Quebec, courts have looked to provincial rules and principles
governing the law of property to determine the attribution of income and losses under the
I.T.A.,[302] the application of the joint and several liability rule in section 160,[303] and
eligibility for the rollover rules in subsections 70(6) and (9).[304] In these and other cases
examined earlier,[305] provincial private law provides the general legal framework or
"suppletive law"[306] to which the I.T.A. applies.
Finally, where the I.T.A. is silent on a matter that is governed by a specific provincial rule
forming part of the law of property and civil rights, courts have generally applied the provincial
rule in order to interpret the I.T.A. In Markevich,[307] for example, the Federal Court of
Appeal concluded that the power to collect tax debts under section 222 of the I.T.A. was
subject to a six-year limitation period under the British Columbia Limitation Act,[308] on the
basis that the I.T.A. did not explicitly preclude the application of this private law rule. Absent
"express language or a necessary implication" to the contrary, the Court emphasized, the
application of the I.T.A. is subject to the "general legal principles, rules and remedies"
established by provincial private law.[309]
In contrast to these cases, others have dissociated the interpretation of the I.T.A. from
provincial private law, interpreting certain concepts and provisions without reference to the
private law of all provinces and others without regard to the civil law of Quebec.[310] In the
Vancouver Society case,[311] for example, the Supreme Court of Canada dissociated the
concept of a "charitable purpose" from the private law of the common law provinces as well as
Quebec.[312] Likewise, the concept "residence" affirmed for the purposes of the I.T.A. in
Thomson,[313] is dissociated from the private law of all provinces,[314] as are the concept of
a "written agreement" for the purpose of the deduction for support payments,[315] the meaning
of the word "construction" in the context of the deduction for manufacturing and processing
profits,[316] and the garnishment rule in section 224 of the I.T.A.[317] In Littler[318] and
Gervais,[319] on the other hand, the concept of a gift was interpreted according to its common
law meaning, thereby maintaining complementarity with the private law of the common law
provinces but dissociating its interpretation from the private law of Quebec.[320] Similarly, in
Olympia & York Developments[321] and Construction Bérou,[322] the concepts of a
disposition and an acquisition of property were interpreted in accordance with the common law
distinction between legal and beneficial ownership, ensuring complementarity with the private
law of the common law provinces but dissociating the meaning of these concepts from the
private law of Quebec.[323] Judicial decisions distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors have also relied on tests derived from the common law, making the
interpretation of these concepts for the purposes of the I.T.A. broadly consistent with the
private law of the common law provinces but noticeably different from the private law of
Quebec.[324]
With the sole exception of Wolf v. The Queen,[325] in which the Federal Court of Appeal
addressed the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor, each of the
cases reviewed in this paper was decided before the enactment of the Federal Law – Civil
Law Harmonization Act. As the interpretation of the I.T.A. is now subject to the statutory
complementarity rule in new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act, therefore, it is
necessary to determine which, if any, of these decisions must be reconsidered. According to
the text of section 8.1, this inquiry turns on whether "it is necessary to refer to a province’s
rules, principles, or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights" to interpret the
relevant concept or provision, and, if so, whether it is "otherwise provided by law".
Beginning with the many cases in which courts have already affirmed or applied a principle of
complementarity between the I.T.A. and provincial private law,[326] it seems clear that these
decisions are unaffected or reaffirmed by the enactment of section 8.1 of the Interpretation
Act. Indeed, since these cases involve the interpretation of concepts with established private
law meanings that are not defined in federal legislation, the application of statutory provisions
that depend on private law relationships that are not defined in federal legislation, and the
interpretation of other provisions that are silent on matters governed by a specific provincial rule
forming part of the law of property and civil rights, references to provincial private law are not
only consistent with the goals and principles underlying Canadian bijuralism but arguably
"necessary" to interpret the I.T.A. and not otherwise provided by law.
Nonetheless, it is always a matter of interpretation whether a provision uses a concept with an
established private law meaning that is not defined in federal legislation, relies on private law
relationships that are not defined in federal legislation, or is silent on a matter governed by a
specific provincial rule forming part of the law of property and civil rights.[327] In Will-Kare,
for example,[328] Binnie J.’s dissenting judgment made a persuasive argument that Parliament
intended the words "goods for sale" in I.T.A. rules governing accelerated capital cost allowance
and investment tax credits to be understood according to their ordinary or plain meaning, not by
reference to "the distinction between a contract for the sale of goods and a contract for work
and materials … developed in a non-tax context aimed at the totally different (and irrelevant)
law governing the rights and obligations of buyers and sellers."[329] Similarly, in
Thomson,[330] the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the concept of "residence" in the
I.T.A. should be understood according to its ordinary meaning without reference to private
law,[331] while the decisions in Jacoby[332] and Démolition A.M. de l’Est Du Québec
Inc.[333] interpreted the terms "written agreement" and "construction" in the context of the
applicable provisions of the I.T.A. in which they appeared without relying on provincial
law.[334] In Marcoux,[335] moreover, the Court relied on the explicit incorporation of
provincial exemptions from the seizure of chattels in subsection 225(5) of the I.T.A. to conclude
that the absence any such reference in section 224 implied a specific intent to disallow provincial
exemptions from the garnishment rule in subsection 224(1).[336] In each of these cases,
therefore, it is arguable that it was not "necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or
concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights" in order to interpret the relevant
concept or provision. As a result, it follows, notwithstanding that they may have dissociated the
interpretation of the I.T.A. from provincial private law, these judgments need not be reversed
under new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act.
In contrast, where provisions in the I.T.A. employ the words "gift" or "charitable" purpose or
activity, rely on the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor, or speak of
an "acquisition" or "disposition" of property, it is arguable that cases that have dissociated these
concepts from provincial private law should be reconsidered on account of new section 8.1. To
begin with, unlike the concept of residence, which is understood in its ordinary meaning, each of
these provisions refers to an established private law concept or relies on private law
relationships that are not completely defined in the I.T.A.[337] In practice, moreover, the
leading judicial decisions in which these provisions have been interpreted refer not to the
ordinary meaning of the words, but to common law concepts and principles.[338]
Consequently, it is necessary to refer to "a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part
of the law of property or civil rights" in order to interpret these provisions. Since the
Constitution Act, 1867 grants exclusive authority to make laws in relation to property and civil
rights to provincial governments, moreover, the interpretation of these provisions must refer to
"a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law or property or civil rights".
As a result, it follows, the complementarity principle in new section 8.1 of the Interpretation
Act should apply in each of these cases, unless it is "otherwise provided by law".
In interpreting new section 8.1, this paper has argued that the exclusion should apply only where
federal legislation explicitly dissociates the interpretation of a concept or provision from
provincial private law or where such dissociation is necessarily implied by the language of the
statutory text.[339] Is such explicit or implicit dissociation apparent in statutory provisions that
employ the words "gift" or "charitable" purpose or activity, rely on the distinction between an
employee and an independent contractor, or refer to an "acquisition" or "disposition" of
property?
Beginning with the concept of a "gift", neither the I.T.A. nor any other federal legislation
explicitly dissociates the meaning of this word from the civil law of Quebec. Nor does the text
of the I.T.A. necessarily imply that the meaning of the word for tax purposes should be
interpreted according to its common law definition. On the contrary, in the cases in which
courts have dissociated the tax concept of a gift from the civil law of Quebec, this result has
been justified solely on the basis that the I.T.A. should apply uniformly throughout
Canada.[340] Although this might be a reasonable presumption of Parliament’s intentions,
however, it cannot outweigh the clear expressions of Parliamentary intent in new section 8.1 of
the federal Interpretation Act and the Preamble to the Federal Law – Civil Law
Harmonization Act that concepts with established private law meanings that are not defined in
the I.T.A. should be interpreted in accordance with provincial private law. As a result, it
follows, the decisions in which courts have dissociated the meaning of a gift in the I.T.A. from
the civil law of Quebec should not be followed.
Unlike the concept of a "gift", the concept of a "charitable" purpose or activity is implicitly
dissociated from the C.C.Q. which, as explained earlier, recognizes the concepts of a "social
trust" and a "socially beneficial purpose", but does not employ the words "charity" or
"charitable".[341] In Quebec, therefore, the interpretation of this concept necessarily must be
dissociated from provincial private law. In common law provinces, on the other hand, the
concepts of a "charitable purpose" or "charity" are often defined in provincial legislation and
subject to judicial interpretation.[342] In these provinces, therefore, it is possible to interpret
the tax concepts of a "charitable" purpose or activity in accordance with provincial private law.
In the Vancouver Society case,[343] however, Gonthier J. concluded that the tax concept of a
"charitable" purpose or activity should also be dissociated from the private law of the common
law provinces on the basis that Parliament intended this concept to be "uniform federal law
across the country."[344] As with the concept of a gift, this may be a reasonable presumption
of Parliament’s intentions, but cannot outweigh the clear expression of a contrary intent in new
section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act and the Preamble to the Federal Law – Civil
Law Harmonization Act. As a result, it follows, where the concepts of a "charitable purpose"
or a "charity" have been defined in provincial legislation forming part of the law of property and
civil rights, the tax concepts of a "charitable" purpose or activity should be interpreted in
accordance with these definitions.
In contrast to the words "gift" and "charitable", the I.T.A. defines the words "employment" and
"business", but does so in such general language that Canadian courts have looked to private
law principles to distinguish between employees and independent contractors.[345] In most tax
cases, these judicial decisions rely on the general test adopted in Wiebe Door,[346] which
corresponds to the private law of the common law provinces but differs from the control or
subordination test contained in the C.C.Q.[347] Neither the I.T.A. nor other federal legislation
explicitly dissociates the meaning of this word from the civil law of Quebec, nor does the text of
the I.T.A. necessarily imply that the meaning of the word for tax purposes should be interpreted
according to its common law definition. Here too, therefore, a general presumption that
Parliament might have intended the distinction between employees and independent contractors
to apply uniformly throughout Canada should not outweigh the explicit affirmation of Canadian
bijuralism in new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act and the Preamble to the Federal
Law – Civil Law Harmonization Act. Consequently, to the extent that tax cases in Quebec
rely on Wiebe Door rather than the C.C.Q.,[348] or as a separate test in addition to the
C.C.Q.,[349] they are incompatible with new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act.
Where a court refers to the general test in Wiebe Door in order to apply the control or
subordination test, on the other hand, complementarity is maintained and section 8.1 need not
apply.[350] In practice, however, the expansive Wiebe Door test may be incompatible with the
singular emphasis on subordination in the C.C.Q.
Although the I.T.A. does not define the meaning of the word "acquisition", it defines the concept
of a "disposition" to include transactions or events entitling taxpayers to "proceeds of
disposition" and exclude transfers "as a consequence of which there is no change in the
beneficial ownership of the property",[351] and defines the term "proceeds of disposition" to
include "the sale price of property that has been sold" as well as various kinds of
compensation.[352] While the concept of beneficial ownership in the definition of a
"disposition" is necessarily dissociated from the private law of Quebec, which does not
distinguish between legal and beneficial ownership, the reference to this common law concept in
the statutory definition of a "disposition" does not specifically define the meaning of a
disposition, but instead excludes certain categories of transactions from the meaning otherwise
determined.[353] For the latter purpose, moreover, the statutory definition generally depends
on the private law concept of a "sale". In Olympia & York Developments,[354] however, the
Court dissociated the meaning of a disposition from the private law of Quebec on the basis that
the concept of a disposition is "obviously the direct opposite"[355] of the common law concept
of an acquisition adopted in Wardean Drilling.[356] In Construction Bérou,[357] moreover,
a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal relied on the statutory definition of a disposition and
statutory references to beneficial ownership in subsection 248(3) to conclude that the concept
of an acquisition should also be dissociated from the private law of Quebec on the basis that
Parliament intended the concepts of an acquisition and a disposition of property to apply
uniformly throughout Canada by incorporating the general common law distinction between legal
and beneficial ownership.
While Parliament’s intention to dissociate the interpretation of the I.T.A. from the civil law of
Quebec is implicit in the exclusion from the definition of a disposition of transfers "as a
consequence of which there is no change in the beneficial ownership of the property", this
intention does not clearly extend to the meaning of a disposition altogether, nor to the concept of
an acquisition which is not defined in the I.T.A. Nor can a general legislative intention that the
concepts of an acquisition and a disposition of property should apply uniformly throughout
Canada outweigh the specific legislative intention in new section 8.1 of the federal
Interpretation Act and the Preamble to the Federal Law – Civil Law Harmonization Act
that provisions that rely on private law relationships that are not fully defined in the I.T.A. should
be interpreted in accordance with provincial private law. As a result, therefore, cases in which
courts have dissociated the tax concepts of an acquisition and a disposition from the private law
of Quebec should also be reconsidered under new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation
Act.
3.2.2. Amendment
In addition to its implications for statutory interpretation, Canadian bijuralism has important
implications for the amendment of the I.T.A. in order to ensure that federal objectives are
pursued in a manner that is consistent with complementarity between federal legislation and
provincial private law and equal recognition of the civil and common law traditions in Canada.
Where complementarity produces unacceptable differences in tax consequences in different
provinces, for example, legislative amendments may be necessary to ensure that the applicable
provision applies uniformly throughout the country. Where the I.T.A. currently achieves such
uniformity through the use of unijural principles and concepts, on the other hand, Canadian
bijuralism suggests that provisions should be redrafted in a manner that does not privilege one
legal tradition over the other. This section reviews a number of concepts and provisions where
legislative amendment may be advisable, proposing specific amendments in some circumstances
and suggesting further investigation in others.
With respect to cases in which complementarity may produce unacceptable differences in
different provinces, one can begin with the concept of a gift, which allows for no consideration
in the common law but does so in the C.C.Q. As a result, it follows, while taxpayers in Quebec
might obtain a deduction or credit for contributions to charitable organizations for which they
receive consideration of a lesser value, taxpayers in the rest of the country would be denied this
benefit. Although the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) has effectively
harmonized the tax consequences in different provinces in certain circumstances by permitting a
deduction or credit for the difference between the purchase price of a ticket to attend "a dinner,
ball, concert, show or like event" or show" and its fair market value,[358] there is no legal basis
for this administrative practice in the common law provinces.[359] Nor does this limited
"exception" to the general common law concept of a gift reflect the actual legal position in
Quebec. For the purpose of the deduction and credit in sections 110.1 and 118.1 of the
I.T.A., moreover, the civil law concept of a gift is better suited to the underlying tax policy
which is designed to subsidize qualifying donees by encouraging donations.[360] For these
reasons, it would be advisable to define the word "gift" for the purpose of these provisions, or
replace this word with a separate term unrelated to civil or common law such as "qualifying
contribution". In either case, the statutory definition of this concept should serve the policy of
the provision by looking to the economic substance of a contribution, rather than the legal form
of a gift.
Another case in which complementarity may produce unacceptable differences in tax
consequences in different provinces involves the concept of a charitable purpose or activity,
which is not recognized in the C.C.Q.,[361] but is subject to different definitions in a number of
statutes in common law provinces.[362] To the extent that these statutory definitions differ from
each other and from the common law test affirmed in the Vancouver Society case,[363] the
kinds of organizations that qualify for the tax advantages associated with this status could differ
from one province to another. For this reason, one might consider codifying the legal definition
of charity in Pemsel,[364] in order to ensure uniformity throughout Canada. Since this
definition is itself based on the common law, however, the broader objectives of Canadian
bijuralism suggest that it might be better to rely on a term or concept that either recognizes or
transcends both legal traditions. Irrespective of this concern, moreover, the traditional definition
of charity has been subject to considerable criticism as restrictive and anachronistic.[365]
Consequently, it might be better to replace the concept of charity in the I.T.A. with a more
functional term like "public benefit organization".
As with the concept of a gift, the distinction between an employee and an independent
contractor is also defined differently in the C.C.Q. and the common law, with the former making
control or subordination the primary test and the latter emphasizing the "total relationship of the
parties" by "weighing all the relevant factors" including control, ownership of tools, chance of
profit and risk of loss, as well as integration.[366] Here too, therefore, complementarity could
lead to unacceptable differences in tax consequences among provinces, with identical
relationships characterized one way in Quebec and another way in the rest of the country.[367]
To the extent that civil law and common law tests are designed for purposes other than tax such
as the imposition of vicarious liability, moreover, these tests may be inappropriate for the income
tax, for which the main implications of the distinction between employees and independent
contractors are the availability of deductions and withholding of tax at source by employers.
For both of these reasons, therefore, it might be advisable to enact a more detailed statutory
definition of the word employment which would emphasize the economic substance of the
relationship rather than its legal form. In this way the tax concept of employment would be
explicitly dissociated both from the definition in the C.C.Q. and from common law tests
developed for different purposes.
Yet another circumstance in which complementarity can produce unacceptable differences in tax
consequences among provinces involves the concepts of an acquisition and a disposition of
property, which have been interpreted to depend on the beneficial ownership of property in all
provinces,[368] but should not be so interpreted in Quebec after the enactment of new section
8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act.[369] As the tax implications of transactions should
generally follow their economic substance rather than their legal form, the emphasis on beneficial
ownership under the common law has distinct advantages over reliance on legal ownership
under the civil law. Nonetheless, the codification of common law concepts like "beneficial
ownership" contradicts the Department of Justice Policy on Legislative Bijuralism by privileging
one legal tradition over the other. As a result, while it would be advisable to amend the
statutory definition of a "disposition" and introduce a statutory definition of the word
"acquisition" to, in effect, codify the decisions in Olympia & York Developments[370] and
Construction Bérou,[371] this should be done through the use of terms and concepts that
recognize both legal traditions.
In addition to these cases, amendments might also be considered to ensure that other terms that
ought not to be interpreted in accordance with private law meanings are not so interpreted
under new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act. Although the concept of "residence"
in the I.T.A. is properly dissociated from provincial private law,[372] for example, courts might
inappropriately rely on new section 8.1 to refer to the concept of residence in the C.C.Q., the
common law, or provincial statutes. For this reason, caution favours the enactment of provision
like section 7.14 of the Quebec Taxation Act,[373] which explicitly dissociates the
interpretation of the concept of residence for tax purposes from its meaning in the C.C.Q. A
similar concern might suggest that I.T.A. provisions governing the deduction and inclusion of
support payments be amended by either defining the term "written agreement" for the purpose
of these provisions or specifying in the relevant provisions that the support must be "payable
under a written agreement that is signed by both parties". For the same reason, the garnishment
rule in section 224 of the I.T.A. might be amended to specifically exclude the application of
provincial exemptions.
With respect to other concepts and provisions considered in this paper, further investigation is
required to determine whether complementarity produces unacceptable differences in tax
consequences in different provinces such that legislative amendments are required. Since the
definition of a "partnership" in the C.C.Q. differs from the common law definition,[374] for
example, complementarity may produce unacceptable differences in tax consequences between
Quebec and the rest of the country.[375] In practice, however, Canadian courts have
concluded that differences between the civil law and common law concepts of a partnership are
substantively immaterial.[376] Whether provincial differences in the definition of a "director"
produce unacceptable variations in the application of the joint and several liability rule in section
227.1 of the I.T.A. should also be examined, as should the more general challenge to uniformity
resulting from different concepts of property ownership in the civil law and the common law.
A final agenda for legislative amendments involves the use of unijural principles and concepts,
such as the rules in subsection 248(3) which deem the civil law concepts of usufruct, right of use
or habitation, and substitution to be a trust, and all rights under these arrangements to be
beneficial interests. Without examining this or other unijural provisions in detail, it is clear that
they contradict the Department of Justice Policy on Legislative Bijuralism and the broader goals
of Canadian bijuralism more generally by subsuming the concepts of one legal tradition within
those of another or disregarding the concepts of one legal tradition altogether. In practice,
moreover, these unijuralisms tend to subordinate the civil law to the common law, reflecting the
historical dominance of common law concepts and principles in federal legislation. Although this
paper does not recommend legislative solutions for these unijuralisms, let alone catalogue their
occurrences in the I.T.A., it endorses the efforts of the federal Department of Justice to ensure
that these "colonial anachronisms" are identified and addressed.[377]
4. Conclusion
At its core, Canadian bijuralism is about recognition and respect – recognition of different
cultures and legal traditions, and respect for these cultures and legal traditions as enduring and
worthy expressions of social organization. While these ideals may seem far removed from the
I.T.A., the pursuit of Canadian bijuralism has important implications for the interpretation and
amendment of this statute. Where the I.T.A. employs concepts with established private law
meanings that are not defined in federal legislation, relies on private law rules or principles to
define the legal relationships to which specific provisions apply, or is silent on a matter that is
governed by a specific provincial rule forming part of the law of property and civil rights, this
paper has argued, Canadian bijuralism requires that courts refer to the private law of the
applicable province in order to interpret the relevant concepts or provisions. Where this
complementary approach to the interpretation of the I.T.A. produces unacceptable differences
in tax consequences in different provinces, however, this paper has argued that uniformity
should be restored through legislative amendments that explicitly dissociate the I.T.A. from
provincial private law, but do so in a way that respects the equal status of the civil law and the
common law in federal legislation. Where the I.T.A. currently achieves such uniformity through
the use of unijural concepts or principles, moreover, these provisions should also be amended to
ensure equal recognition of both legal traditions.
In practice, Canadian courts routinely refer to provincial private law to interpret the I.T.A.,
relying on private law meanings to interpret undefined terms in the I.T.A., private law rules and
principles to determine the legal relationships to which I.T.A. provisions apply, and provincial
rules to address issues that are not addressed in the I.T.A. In several cases, however,
Canadian courts have interpreted concepts or provisions of the I.T.A. without regard to the
private law of the applicable province, dissociating the interpretation of the I.T.A. from the
private law of all provinces or from the civil law of Quebec. Although the dissociation of some
concepts may be justified on the basis that they are properly understood according to their
ordinary meanings, other provisions clearly refer to concepts and relationships defined by
private law, and therefore should, under new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act, be
interpreted in accordance with provincial private law. Where the application of this statutory
complementarity rule produces unacceptable differences in tax consequences among different
provinces, however, specific legislative amendments are advisable.
While the aims of Canadian bijuralism are broad and aspirational, its realization in the I.T.A. can
be detailed and technical. This inevitable detail should not obscure the underlying values of
recognition and respect that motivate the endeavour.



* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. For research assistance in the
preparation of this paper, I am indebted to Chris Bystrom and Simon Proulx.
[1] R.S.C. 1985 (5th suppl.), c.1, as amended.
[2] Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1 (H.L.), per
Lord Tomlin at 20-21 (hereinafter Duke of Westminster). This general principle is subject to
specific anti-avoidance rules such as those in subsections 6(3) and 16(1) and section 68 of the
ITA, which may apply "irrespective of … the form or legal effect" of a contract or agreement,
and to the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) in section 245, which permits an assessment
of tax consequences to deny a tax benefit that would otherwise result from transactions and
arrangements entered into primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.
[3]Shell Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, [1999] 4 C.T.C. 313, 99 D.T.C. 5669 (S.C.C.) at para.
39, per McLachlin, C.J.C.
[4] The Constitution Act, 1867, 30-31 Victoria, c. 3, subsection 92(13) (formerly the British
North America Act) (hereinafter "Constitution Act, 1867").
[5] Civil Code of Québec, L.Q. 1991, c.64 (hereinafter "C.C.Q.").
[6]For a brief discussion of the characteristics and context of these two legal traditions in
Canada, see Marie-Claude Gervais and Marie-France Séguin, "Some Thoughts on Bijuralism in
Canada and the World," in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of
the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, Second Publication (Ottawa:
Department of Justice, 2001), Booklet 2, at 3-6.
[7] Ibid. at 1.
[8]Ibid. Given the presence of Aboriginal law as well as differences between common law
provinces, the authors note that it might be more appropriate to speak of "plurijuralism" or
"legal pluralism" rather than bijuralism.
[9]Hon. Justice Michel Bastarache, "Bijuralism in Canada" in The Harmonization of Federal
Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra
note 6, Booklet 1, 19 at 25. See also France Allard, "The Supreme Court of Canada and its
Impact on the Expression of Bijuralism" in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with
the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet
3 at 2: "Bijuralism is based on a dialogue between cultures, a mutual recognition of the other, a
complementary relationship between the rules specific to each one and their interpretation with
respect to the other."
[10] Jean-Maurice Brisson and André Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity,
Dissociation," in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and
Canadian Bijuralism, Collection of Studies (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1999)
217 at 224. For a brief discussion of this ancillary power, see Catherine Valke, "Quebec Civil
Law and Canadian Federalism" (1996), 21 Yale J. Int. L. 67 at 98-101.
[11]A good example is section 427 of the federal Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46 (formerly section
178 of the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1), which establishes a security interest that
corresponds neither to common law nor to civil law concepts. See Roderick A. Macdonald,
"Security Under Section 178 of the Bank Act: A Civil Law Analysis" (1983), 43 Can. Bar
Rev. 1007.
[12] Constitution Act, 1867, subsection 91(3).
[13] Brisson and Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity, Dissociation" supra
note 10 at 223.
[14]Louise Maguire Wellington, "Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and
Terminology" in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the
Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet 4 at 10.
[15]See the discussion of "mixed law" in Gervais and Séguin, supra note 6 at 7.
[16]Brisson and Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity, Dissociation"supra
note 10 at 237.
[17]Louise Maguire Wellington, "Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and
Terminology" supra note 14 at 4.
[18]Ibid. at 5.
[19] See Brisson and Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity, Dissociation"
supra note 10 at 219-25.
[20]See ibid. at 228-39, and the brief discussion of "implicit dissociation" in Marc Cuerrier,
"The Harmonization of Federal Tax Legislation" in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation
with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6,
Booklet 7 at 18-19.
[21]Excerpted in Wellington, "Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and
Terminology" supra note 14 at 22-23.
[22] S.C. 2001, c. 4.
[23]R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21 [as am.], sections 8.1 and 8.2 (added by S.C. 2001, c. 4, s. 8,
proclaimed in force June 1, 2001).
[24]Duke of Westminster, supra note 2 at 20-21.
[25] (1960), 25 Tax A.B.C. 166, 60 D.T.C. 554 (T.A.B.).
[26] Ibid. at para. 31 and 33.
[27]Hereinafter C.C.L.C.
[28] [1974] C.T.C. 687, 74 D.T.C. 6569 (F.C.T.D.).
[29] Ibid. at para. 25-27.
[30] Ibid. at para. 34.
[31] [1980] C.T.C. 265, 80 D.T.C. 6184 (F.C.T.D.) (hereinafter Olympia & York
Developments).
[32] Ibid. at para. 9 and 10.
[33] Ibid. at para. 24.
[34] Ibid. at para. 41-44. This aspect of the decision, which incorporated common law
concepts in order to determine the concept of a disposition for tax purposes, is examined in
section 2.5, infra.
[35]Ibid. at para. 38.
[36][1962] C.T.C. 1, 62 D.T.C. 1005 (S.C.C.).
[37]In addition to the civil law, the Court relied on the scheme of the ITA, which, it held, did not
tax "the ownership of a thing" but instead levied tax on each taxpayer on "the income that he
receives from his employment, his business, his property, or the property of which he is the legal
beneficiary." Ibid. at para. 8.
[38]Ibid. at para. 26.
[39]See, e.g., No. 738 v. M.N.R. (1962), 28 Tax A.B.C. 227; Bedford v. M.N.R. (1964) 35
Tax A.B.C. 397; M.N.R. v. Simon, [1977] C.T.C. 340, 77 D.T.C. 5228 (S.C.C.);
Lachapelle v. M.N.R., [1982] C.T.C. 2556, 82 D.T.C. 1593 (T.R.B.); Béique v. The Queen,
[1981] C.T.C. 75, 81 D.T.C. 5050 (F.C.A.); Dumais v. M.N.R., [1990] 1 C.T.C. 342, 89
D.T.C. 5543 (F.C.T.D.); Coriandoli v. Canada, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2919 (T.C.C.); and Coté
v. The Queen, [2000] 4 C.T.C. 78, 2000 D.T.C. 6188 (F.C.A.). In Dumais, supra, the Court
also emphasized that this result would ensure that all taxpayers in the federation would be
treated equally. For an opposing result, in which the Court interpreted the Civil Code to require
a capital gain to be split equally between spouses, see Laporte v. M.N.R., [1984] C.T.C.
2260, 84 D.T.C. 1208 (T.C.C.).
[40]ITA, subsection 248(22), added by 1994, c. 7, Sch. II (1991, c. 49), subsection 192(18),
applicable after July 13, 1990.
[41] See ITA subsections 74.1(1) and 74.2(1).
[42] ITA, section 160.
[43] [1985] 1 C.T.C. 153, 85 D.T.C. 5408 (F.C.T.D.).
[44] [1990] 1 C.T.C. 33, 90 D.T.C. 6237 (F.C.T.D.).
[45]Ibid. at para. 25 and 26.
[46] For other cases in which courts have relied on the civil law of Quebec to determine the
application of the joint and several liability rule in section 160 of the ITA, see, e.g., D’Aoust v.
The Queen, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 2309, 98 D.T.C. 1344 (T.C.C.); MacDougall v. The Queen,
[1998] 4 C.T.C. 2474, 98 D.T.C. 2180 (T.C.C.); and Martel v. The Queen, [1999] 2 C.
T.C. 2497, 98 D.T.C. 2012 (T.C.C.).
[47] See, e.g., No. 71 v. M.N.R. (1952),7 Tax A.B.C. 165; Ste-Marie v. M.N.R. (1956), 15
Tax A.B.C. 46, 56 D.T.C. 211; Derby Development Corp. v. M.N.R., [1963] C.T.C. 269,
63 D.T.C. 1171 (Exch. Ct.); Vaintrub v. M.N.R. (1964), 35 Tax A.B.C. 74, 64 D.T.C. 227;
Entreprises Blaton-Aubert Société Anonyme v. MNR, [1969] Tax A.B.C. 68, 69 D.T.C.
121; Hollinger v. M.N.R., [1972] C.T.C. 592, 73 D.T.C. 5003 (F.C.T.D), aff’d [1974]
C.T.C. 693, 74 D.T.C. 6604 (F.C.A.); M.N.R. v. Poulin, [1976] C.T.C. 620, 76 D.T.C.
6381 (F.C.T.D.); Beausoleil v. M.N.R., [1976] C.T.C. 2142, 76 D.T.C. 1113 (T.R.B.);
Marinis v. M.N.R., [1978] C.T.C. 2821, 78 D.T.C. 1609 (T.R.B.); Lohe v. M.N.R., [1979]
C.T.C. 3107, 79 D.T.C. 880 (T.R.B.); Cornforth v. The Queen, [1982] C.T.C. 45, 82
D.T.C. 6058 (F.C.T.D.); Dufresne v. M.N.R., [1983] C.T.C. 2270, 83 D.;T.C. 238 (T.R.B.);
Bédard v. M.N.R., [1984] C.T.C. 2239, 84 D.T.C. 1204 (T.C.C.); Péloquin v. M.N.R.,
[1984] C.T.C. 2950, 84 D.T.C. 1857 (T.C.C.); Ryan v. M.N.R., [1992] 2 C.T.C. 2288, 92
D.T.C. 2027 (T.C.C.); Waxman v. The Queen, [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2723, 97 D.T.C. 705
(T.C.C.); McKeown v. The Queen, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 2197, 2001 D.T.C. 511 (T.C.C.); and
Drolet v. The Queen, 2001 CarswellNat 1729 (T.C.C.).
[48] M.N.R. v. J. Colford Contracting Co., [1960] C.T.C. 178, 60 D.T.C. 1131 (Exch. Ct.),
aff’d [1962] C.T.C. 546, 62 D.T.C. 1338 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Colford Contracting).
[49]Savard v. M.N.R., [1990] 1 C.T.C. 2576, 90 D.T.C. 1476 (T.C.C.).
[50] See, e.g., Aspinall v. M.N.R., [1970] Tax A.B.C. 1073, 70 D.T.C. 1669; Paradis v.
The Queen, [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2557 (T.C.C.); Slobodrian v. The Queen, [1998] 3 C.T.C.
2654 (T.C.C.); Plante v. The Queen, [1999] 2 C.T.C. 2631 (T.C.C.); Langlois v. The
Queen, 2000 D.T.C. 6612 (F.C.A.); Marcoux-Côté v. The Queen, 2000 D.T.C. 6615
(F.C.A.); and Duguay v. The Queen, [2002] 1 C.T.C. 8, 2000 D.T.C. 6620 (F.C.A.).
[51] See, e.g., Braive v. M.N.R., [1981] C.T.C. 2790, 81 D.T.C. 748 (T.R.B.); Tedco
Apparel Management Services Inc. v M.N.R., [1991] 2 C.T.C. 2669, 91 D.T.C. 1413
(T.C.C.); and Wolf v. The Queen, 2002 D.T.C. 6853 (F.C.A.).
[52] [1998] 4 C.T.C. 119, 98 D.T.C. 6505 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Continental Bank).
[53] R.S.O. 1980, c. 370.
[54]Continental Bank, supra note 52 at para. 22-23 and 25.
[55]Ibid. at para. 25.
[56] In addition to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Continental Bank, a number of
cases in common law provinces have referred to provincial partnership statutes in order to
determine whether a business was carried on in a partnership. See, e.g., Sunshine Uniform
Supply (1983) Ltd. v. The Queen, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 107, 2000 D.T.C. 6127 (F.C.T.D.)
(Manitoba); Bow River Pipelines Ltd. v. The Queen, [2001] 1 C.T.C. 198, 2000 D.T.C.
6090 (F.C.A.) (Alberta); Vantem Holdings Ltd v. The Queen, [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2821, 98
D.T.C. 1335 (T.C.C.) (British Columbia); Schultz v. The Queen, [1996] 2 C.T.C. 127, 95
D.T.C. 5657 (F.C.A.) (Ontario); Kuchirka v. The Queen, [1991] 1 C.T.C. 339, 91 D.T.C.
5156 (F.C.T.D. (Saskatchewan); and Graves v. Canada, [1990] 1 C.T.C. 357, 90 D.T.C.
6300 (F.C.T.D.) (Nova Scotia). See also Backman v. The Queen, [2001] 2 C.T.C. 11, 2001
D.T.C. 5149 (S.C.C.) and Spire Freezers Ltd. v. The Queen, [2001] 2 C.T.C. 40, 2001
D.T.C. 5158 (S.C.C.), in each of which the Supreme Court of Canada relied on the common
law concept of a partnership to determine the existence of partnerships located in Texas and
California.
[57][1969] C.T.C. 265, 69 D.T.C. 5194 (Exch. Ct.) (hereinafter Wardean Drilling).
[58] R.S.A. 1955, c. 295.
[59]Wardean Drilling, supra note 57 at para 27-30.
[60]Ibid. at para. 36-37.
[61] [1992] 1 C.T.C. 15, 92 D.T.C. 6023 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter West Kootenay).
[62] R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 370.
[63] West Kootenay, supra note 61 at para. 37.
[64] [2000] 3 C.T.C. 463, 2000 D.T.C. 6467 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Will-Kare).
[65]See class 39 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Regulations, the investment tax credit in
subsection 127(5) of the ITA, and the definitions of "investment tax credit" and "qualified
property" in subsection 127(9).
[66] Will-Kare, supra note 64 at para. 29.
[67]Ibid. at para. 30-31.
[68]Ibid. at para. 35.
[69]According to Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (London, 1974): "Where work is to be done on
the land of the employer or on a chattel belonging to him, which involves the use or affixing of
materials belonging to the person employed, the contract will ordinarily be one for work and
materials, the property in the latter passing to the employer by accession and not under a
contract of sale."
[70] Will-Kare, supra note 64 at para. 36.
[71] [1985] 1 C.T.C. 229, 85 D.T.C. 5064 (F.C.T.D.).
[72] Ibid. at para. 38-39.
[73]Ibid. at para. 40.
[74][1981] C.T.C. 2330, 81 D.T.C. 307 (T.R.B.).
[75]For a similar result, in which a capital gain was divided equally among four taxpayers on the
basis that the two husbands held their shares subject to resulting trusts in their wives’ favour, see
Fernando v. The Queen, [1997] 3 C.T.C. 2850, 97 D.T.C. 1376 (T.C.C.).
[76][1996] 1 C.T.C. 3001 (T.C.C.).
[77]Anderson Estate v. Canada, [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2454, 95 D.T.C. 758 (T.C.C.).
[78]Holizki v. The Queen, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 420, 95 D.T.C. 5591 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d [1998] 3
C.T.C. 125, 98 D.T.C. 6530 (F.C.A.).
[79]See, e.g., Boles v. M.N.R., [1982] C.T.C. 2638, 82 D.T.C. 1643 (T.R.B.); Erikson v.
M.N.R., [1988] 2 C.T.C. 2380, 88 D.T.C. 1705 (T.C.C.); Harms v. M.N.R., [1990] 1
C.T.C. 2010, 89 D.T.C. 705 (T.C.C.); Nelson v. M.N.R., [1990] 2 C.T.C. 2525, 91 D.T.C.
37 (T.C.C.); Gosse v. Canada, [1993] 2 C.T.C. 2205, 93 D.T.C. 1017 (T.C.C.); Karavos
v. The Queen, [1996] 1 C.T.C. 2206, 96 D.T.C. 1001 (T.C.C.); Collins v. The Queen, 96
D.T.C. 1034 (T.C.C.), aff’d 98 D.T.C. 6281 (F.C.A.); and Landy v. The Queen, 2000
D.T.C. 1460 (T.C.C.). In some of these cases, courts have questioned whether it is
appropriate to inquire into the existence of a constructive trust in the context of a proceeding
concerning income tax.
[80]For a critical examination of this caselaw, see Catherine Brown and Cindy L. Rajan,
"Constructive and Resulting Trusts: Challenging Tax Boundaries" (1997), 45 Can. Tax J. 659-
689.
[81] [1988] 2 C.T.C. 2285, 88 D.T.C. 1649 (T.C.C.).
[82] For a similar result, see Linke v. Canada, [1994] 2 C.T.C. 2117, 94 D.T.C. 1549
(T.C.C.).
[83][1993] 2 C.T.C. 2330, 93 D.T.C. 552 (T.C.C.).
[84] [2000] 2 C.T.C. 35, 2000 D.T.C. 6149 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Biderman).
[85]Re Paradise Motor Co., [1968] 2 All E.R. 625 (Eng. C.A.) at p. 632.
[86]Biderman, supra note 84 at para. 46.
[87]See subsections 70(6) and 70(9) of the ITA.
[88] [1993] 2 C.T.C. 81, 93 D.T.C. 5276 (F.C.A.).
[89] R.S.A. 2980, D-34.
[90] [1983] C.T.C. 348, 83 D.T.C. 5365 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Hillis).
[91] R.S.S. 1978, c. D-25, formerly R.S.S. 1965, c. 128 (am. S.S. 1967, c. 23).
[92] R.S.S. 1978, c. I-13, formerly R.S.S. 1965, c. 126.
[93] As it currently reads, subsection 70(6) requires such vesting "within the period ending 36
months after the death of the taxpayer or, where written application therefor has been made to
the Minister by the taxpayer’s legal representative within that period, within such longer period
as the Minister considers reasonable in the circumstances".
[94] Hillis, supra note 90 at para. 37: "Parliament contemplated that the law of the provinces in
respect of the disposition of property on or after death, being matters relating to property and
civil rights, would apply so as to control the application of subsection 70(6) in accordance with
the law of the particular province concerned…. Subsection 4(2) deems, on the facts of this
case, the intestate taxpayer to be a testator providing for the distribution of his estate as on an
intestacy. Subsection 14(1) provides that where, as here, a Court order has been made, the
deemed disposition by will (pursuant to subsection 4(2)) "... shall have effect, and shall be
deemed to have had effect from the testator's death, as if it had been executed with such
variations as are specified in the order, for the purpose of giving effect to the provision for
maintenance made by the order"…. In view of the provisions of subsections 4(2) and 14(1)
supra, I conclude that subject order vested the entire estate of the deceased taxpayer in the
widow which vesting is deemed to have had effect from the taxpayer's death."
[95] See ibid. at para. 12-13, per Clement D.J., observing that the retroactive effect of the
order was "for the purpose of giving effect to the provision for maintenance made by the order",
and concluding that "fictions for provincial purposes" cannot affect the application of the ITA
which "takes its operation in the realities of the circumstances, subject only to such directives as
it may itself prescribe"; and ibid. at para. 31, per Pratte J.: "It is only when the disclaimers were
executed and the Court order was pronounced that Mrs Hillis became entitled to the whole of
her husband's estate with retroactive effect to the date of his death. If, therefore, the disclaimers
and the Court order had, as contended by the appellants, the effect of vesting the estate in Mrs
Hillis, that effect did not take place within 15 months after the death of Mr Hillis."
[96]Ibid. at para. 20.
[97] [1996] 2 C.T.C. 1, 96 D.T.C. 6132 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Kalef).
[98] S.O. 1982, c. 4.
[99]Kalef, supra note 97 at para. 10 and 15.
[100] [1999] 2 C.T.C. 395, 99 D.T.C. 5658 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Wheeliker).
[101] R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 42.
[102]Wheeliker, supra note 100 at para. 7.
[103]Ibid. at para. 19.
[104]Ibid. at para. 27.
[105]Ibid. at para. 33.
[106] [1997] 2 C.T.C. 286, 97 D.T.C. 5252 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Dale).
[107] R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 81.
[108]Dale, supra note 106 at para. 18.
[109] In response to the Minister’s argument that the Court was bound by the conclusion in
Hillis, supra note 90, Robertson J.A. (Décary J.A., concurring) stated in Dale, supra note 106
at para. 21, that the Hillis decision was "a fragmented one which, respectfully, reveals no
discernible ratio."
[110] [2001] 3 C.T.C. 39, 2001 D.T.C. 5305 (F.C.A.) (leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted
December 6, 2001) (hereinafter Markevich).
[111] R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, s. 3(5).
[112] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50. According to this provision: "Except as otherwise provided in this
Act or in any other Act of Parliament, the laws relating to prescription and the limitation of
actions in force in a province between subject and subject apply to any proceedings by or
against the Crown in respect of any cause of action arising in that province …."
[113]Markevich, supra note 110 at para. 25.
[114]Ibid. at para. 16.
[115]Ibid, at para. 29.
[116]For a useful analysis of judicial decisions which have interpreted the concept of a gift for
the purposes of the I.T.A., see Blake Bromley, "Flaunting and Flouting the Law of Gift:
CCRA’s Philanthrophobia," Estate, Trust & Pension Journal (forthcoming).
[117]Woolner v. The Queen, [2000] 1 C.T.C. 35, 99 D.T.C. 5722 (F.C.A.) at para. 7. For
similar definitions, see The Queen v. Zandstra, [1974] C.T.C. 503, 74 D.T.C. 6416
(F.C.T.D.) (hereinafter Zandstra)at paras. 19-22; McBurney v. The Queen, [1985] 2 C.T.C.
214, 85 D.T.C. 5433 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter McBurney)at para. 11-13; Burns v. M.N.R.,
[1988] 1 C.T.C. 201, 88 D.T.C. 6101 (F.C.T.D.) (hereinafter Burns)at para. 24-26, aff’d
[1990] 1 C.T.C. 350, 90 D.T.C. 6335 (F.C.A.); Friedberg v. Canada, [1992] 1 C.T.C. 1,
92 D.T.C. 6031 (F.C.A.) at para. 4; and Whent v. The Queen, [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2542, 96
D.T.C. 1594 (T.C.C.) at para. 37, aff’d [2000] 1 C.T.C. 329, 2000 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.).
[118]See, e.g., McBurney, supra note 117 at para. 11: "The word "gifts" is not defined in the
statute. I can find nothing in the context to suggest that it is used in a technical rather than in its
ordinary sense."
[119] See the authorities cited in Zandstra, supra note 117; and McBurney, supra note 117.
For explicit recognition of the common law basis of this test, see Woolner, supra note 117 at
para. 7; and Whent, supra note 117 at para. 37.
[120]See, e.g., Gaudin v. M.N.R., 13 Tax A.B.C. 199, 55 D.T.C. 385 (sale of house for half
its value); Tite v. M.N.R, [1986] 2 C.T.C. 2343, 86 D.T.C. 1788 (T.C.C.) (purchase of print
for an amount in excess of its fair market value); Zandstra, supra note 117 (donation to
religious school attended by taxpayer’s children); McBurney, supra note 117 (donation to
religious school attended by taxpayer’s children); and Burns, supra note 117 (donation to ski
association of which taxpayer’s daughter was a member).
[121]According to Article 1806 of the C.C.Q.: "Gift is a contract by which a person, the
donor, transfers ownership of property by gratuitous title to another person, the donee; a
dismemberment of the right of ownership, or any other right held by a person, may also be
transferred by gift." According to Article 1810: "A remunerative gift or a gift with a charge
constitutes a gift only for the value in excess of that of the remunerative charge."
[122]Gagnon v. M.N.R. (1960), 24 Tax A.B.C. 309, 60 D.T.C. 347.
[123] Supra note 50 (hereinafter Aspinall).
[124][1978] C.T.C. 235, 78 D.T.C. 6179 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Littler).
[125] In particular, the Minister cited Charlebois v. Charlebois, [1974] C.A. 99 (Que. C.A.),
which considered a sale at less than fair market value to be an indirect gift under Article 712 of
the C.C.L.C.
[126]Littler, supra note 124 at para. 12.
[127]Ibid. at para. 10 and 11.
[128] In a concurring opinion, LeDain J. found for the taxpayer on a more narrow basis,
concluding that the particular notion of an indirect gift in then Article 712 of the C.C.L.C. "is not
of such general application to the meaning of gift that it should be ascribed to the legislative
intention" regarding the federal gift tax. Ibid. at para. 19.
[129] [1984] C.T.C. 661, 85 D.T.C. 5004 (F.C.T.D.) (hereinafter Gervais).
[130]Ibid. at para.12.
[131]For a critical evaluation of the non-refundable credit for individual contributions, see David
G. Duff, "Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax: Evaluating the Canadian
Credit" in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman, and David Stevens, Between State and Market:
Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001) 407-56.
[132] See the definition of "registered charity" in subsection 248(1) of the I.T.A., and the
definitions of "private foundation" and "public foundation" in I.T.A. subsection 149.1(1).
[133]See the definitions of "charitable organization" and "charitable foundation" in I.T.A.
subsection 149.1(1).
[134] [1999] 2 C.T.C. 1, 99 D.T.C. 5034 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Vancouver Society). For a
critical analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Vancouver Society case, see
Mayo Moran and Jim Phillips, "Charity and the Income Tax Act: The Supreme Court Speaks"
in Phillips et. al, supra note 131, 343-70.
[135] [1891] A.C. 531 (hereinafter Pemsel). According to Lord Macnaghton at 583:
"’Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty;
trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for
other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads."
[136] See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada v. M.N.R., [1966] C.T.C. 755, 67 D.T.C.
5003 (S.C.C.); Vancouver Regional FreeNet Association v. M.N.R., [1996] 3 C.T.C. 102,
96 D.T.C. 6440 (F.C.A.); Briarpatch Incorporated v. The Queen, [1996] 2 C.T.C. 94, 96
D.T.C. 6294 (F.C.A.); Everywoman's Health Centre Society (1988) v. The Queen, [1991]
2 C.T.C. 320, 92 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.); Reed v. The Queen, [1989] 2 C.T.C. 192, 89
D.T.C. 5230 (F.C.T.D.); N.D.G. Neighbourhood Association v. M.N.R., [1988] 2 C.T.C.
14, 88 D.T.C. 6279 (F.C.A.); Toronto Volgograd Committee v. M.N.R., [1988] 1 C.T.C.
365, 88 D.T.C. 6192 (F.C.A.); Positive Action Against Pornography v. M.N.R., [1988] 1
C.T.C. 232, 88 D.T.C. 6186 (F.C.A.); Native Communications Society of B.C. v. M.N.R.,
[1986] 2 C.T.C. 170, 86 D.T.C. 6353 (F.C.A.); Scarborough Community Legal Services v.
M.N.R., [1985] 1 C.T.C. 98, 85 D.T.C. 5102 (F.C.A.); and McBurney v. M.N.R., supra note
117.
[137]Vancouver Society, supra note 134 at para. 143.
[138]Ibid. at para. 28.
[139]Ibid.
[140]According to Article 1266: "Trusts are constituted for personal purposes or for purposes
of private or social utility." According to Article 1270: "A social trust is a trust constituted for a
purpose of general interest, such as a cultural, educational, philanthropic, religious or scientific
purpose."
[141]According to Article 1256: "A foundation results from an act whereby a person
irrevocably appropriates the whole or part of his property to the durable fulfillment of a socially
beneficial purpose."
[142] See, e.g., paragraph 1(1)(c) of the Charitable Fund-Raising Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-9,
which defines a "charitable purpose" to include "a philanthropic, benevolent, educational, health,
humane, religious, cultural, artistic or recreational purpose, so long as the purpose is not part of
a business"; section 1 of the Liquor Control and Licensing Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 267,
which defines a "charitable purpose" to include, in addition to the Pemsel categories, the
"advancement" of "(a) recreation; (b) sports or athletics; (c) aid to the disabled and
handicapped; (d) culture; [and] (e) youth or citizens"; subsection 1(1) of the Charities
Endorsement Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. C-60, which defines a "charitable purpose" to include "any
charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, athletic, artistic, or civic purpose and any
purpose that has as its object the promotion of a civic improvement or the provision of a public
service"; and the definition of "charity" in the Charities Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1988, c. C-4, as "any
person, association, institute or organization under whose auspices funds for benevolent,
educational, cultural, charitable or religious purposes are to be raised." See also the definition
of "charitable purpose" in section 7 of the Charities Accounting Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-10,
s. 7, which adopts the Pemsel categories, and the interpretation of this provision in Re Laidlaw
Foundation (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 549 (Ont. H.C.).
[143]Vancouver Society, supra note 134 at para. 28.
[144]Ibid.
[145] In addition to its importance for the I.T.A., the distinction between employees and
independent contractors is central to the application of the Employment Insurance Act, S.C.
1996, c. 23; and the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8. Although Canadian courts
apply the same tests to distinguish employees and independent contractors under all of these
statutes, this paper concerns itself only with the distinction drawn for purposes of the I.T.A.
[146]While employees must compute their income under subdivision a of Division B of Part I of
the I.T.A. ("Income or Loss from an Office or Employment") which allows only those
deductions specifically listed in section 8 of the I.T.A., independent contractors compute their
income under subdivision b of Division B of Part I of the I.T.A. ("Income or Loss from a
Business or Property") which permits a much broader range of deductions in computing their
profit from the business. In addition, where an individual who carries on a business of providing
services to a person or partnership through a corporation "would reasonably be regarded as an
officer or employee of the person or partnership … but for the existence of the corporation,"
the corporation is precluded from the reduced corporate tax rate under section 125 of the
I.T.A., and limited to the deductions allowed by I.T.A. paragraph 18(1)(p). For a detailed
discussion of these statutory rules and judicial decisions in which they have been applied, see
David G. Duff, Canadian Income Tax Law, (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery and Canadian
Tax Foundation, 2002), chapters 4 and 5.
[147] Under the Canada – United States Tax Convention, for example, Article XV permits
each Contracting State to tax non-residents who are employed in the State. In contrast, Article
XIV allows each Contracting State to tax non-residents carrying on "independent personal
services" in the State only if the non-resident "has or had a fixed base regularly available" in the
State, and "only to the extent that the income is attributable to the fixed base."
[148]See, e.g., I.T.A. paragraph 153(1)(a) and section 101 of the Income Tax Regulations,
which make employers responsible for withholding prescribed amounts from salaries, wages
and other remuneration payable to employees, and remitting these amounts to the Receiver
General. In contrast, I.T.A. subsection 156(1) requires independent contractors to pay
quarterly tax instalments based on taxes paid in the previous year or estimated taxes for the
current year.
[149]See the definition of "employment" in I.T.A. subsection 248(1).
[150]See the definition of "business" in I.T.A. subsection 248(1).
[151]For useful discussions of Canadian cases distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors, see Marc Noël, "Contract for Services, Contract of Services – A Tax
Perspective and Analysis" in Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Tax
Conference, 1977 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1978), 712-40;
Brian J. Wilson, "Employment Status under the Income Tax Act" in Income Tax and Goods
and Services Tax Planning for Executive and Employee Compensation and Retirement,
1991 Corporate Management Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1992),
2:1-61; Joanne E. Magee, "Whose Business is It? Employees versus Independent Contractors"
(1997), 45 Can. Tax J. 584-603; and Alain Gaucher, "A Worker’s Status as Employee or
Independent Contractor" in Report of the Proceedings of the Fifty-First Tax Conference,
1999 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2000), 33:1-98. For an
excellent analysis of the relationship between these tests and the concept of employment in the
C.C.Q., see John W. Durnford, "Employee or Independent Contractor? The Interplay Between
the Civil Code and the Income Tax Act" in Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau, (Cowansville:
Yvon Blais, 1997) 273-309.
[152] [1986] 2 C.T.C. 200, 87 D.T.C. 5025 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Wiebe Door).
[153]Ibid. at para. 2.
[154] Although unreported, the key passages from the trial decision are excerpted in the
Federal Court of Appeal decision, ibid. at para. 3.
[155] Ibid. According to this test, the distinction between a "contract of service" or employment
and a "contract for services" with an independent contractor is that the former allows the payer
to specify not only what work to be done, but the manner in which the work is to be carried
out.
[156] Ibid. According to these tests, the distinction between employees and independent
contractors depends not on the legal character of the contract, but on the economic substance
or reality of the relationship. To the extent that individuals own the tools necessary to carry on
their work, and have an opportunity to profit and a risk of loss, their economic status is more
like that of a business than that of an employee.
[157] Ibid. According to this test, which emphasizes the social character of the relationship,
employees carry out their work "as an integral part of the business", while the work of
independent contractors, "although done for the business, is not integrated into it, but is only
accessory to it": Stevenson Jordan and Harrison, Ltd. v. MacDonald and Evans, [1952]
T.L.R. 101 at 111.
[158] Wiebe Door, supra note 152 at para. 3 (emphasis in original).
[159]Ibid. at paras. 14, 16 and 18. According to the Court (ibid.at para. 14): "As thus applied,
this can never be a fair test, because in a factual relationship of mutual dependency it must
always result in an affirmative answer. If the businesses of both parties are so structured as to
operate through each other, they could not survive independently without being restructured.
But that is a consequence of their surface arrangement and not necessarily expressive of their
intrinsic relationship."
[160]Ibid. at para. 17.
[161]Although the Court rejects the integration test as a general test to distinguish employees
from independent contractors (ibid. at para. 13), its subsequent comments on the proper
application of the test (ibid. at para. 16 and 18) confirm its continued relevance as an element in
the overall determination.
[162]Ibid. at para. 15.
[163] See, e.g., Moose Jaw Kinsmen Flying Fins v. M.N.R., [1988] 2 C.T.C. 2377, 88
D.T.C. 6099 (F.C.A.); Bradford v. M.N.R., [1988] 2 C.T.C. 2359, 88 D.T.C. 1661
(T.C.C.); Sutherland v. Canada, [1991] 1 C.T.C. 495, 91 D.T.C. 5318 (F.C.T.D.); Bart v.
M.N.R., [1991] 1 C.T.C. 2632, 91 D.T.C. 884 (T.C.C.); Tedco Apparel Management
Services Inc. v. M.N.R., supra note 51; Qureshi v. M.N.R., [1992] 1 C.T.C. 2370, 92
D.T.C. 1150 (T.C.C.); David T. McDonald Co. v. M.N.R., [1992] 2 C.T.C. 2607, 92
D.T.C. 1917(T.C.C.); Beaulieu v. The Queen, [1993] 2 C.T.C. 2323 (T.C.C.); Société de
Projets ETPA Inc. v. M.N.R., [1993] 1 C.T.C. 2392, 93 D.T.C. 516 (T.C.C.); Placements
Marcel Lapointe Inc. v. M.N.R., [1993] 1 C.T.C. 2506, 93 D.T.C. 821 (T.C.C.); Dorosh v.
Canada, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2568 (T.C.C.); Vango v. Canada, [1995] 2 C.T.C. 2757
(T.C.C.); Korpan v. Canada, [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2991(T.C.C.); McNeil v. The Queen, [1995]
2 C.T.C. 2869, 95 D.T.C. 702 (T.C.C); Gitche Gumee Consultants Ltd. v. Canada, [1995]
2 C.T.C. 2764 (T.C.C.); Nelson v. The Queen, [1998] 1 C.T.C. 2008, 97 D.T.C. 1253
(T.C.C.); MacLeod v. The Queen, [1999] 4 C.T.C. 2223 (T.C.C.); Benn v. The Queen¸
[2000] 3 C.T.C. 2001, 2000 D.T.C. 2051 (T.C.C.); Marian v. The Queen, [2001] 1 C.T.C.
2508 (T.C.C.); Goorah v. The Queen, [2001] 3 C.T.C. 2500 (T.C.C.); Criterion Capital
Corp. v. The Queen, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 2844, 2001 D.T.C. 921 (T.C.C.); and Wolf v. The
Queen, supra note 51. For a detailed review of cases decided since Wiebe Door, see
Gaucher, supra note 151 at 58-66.
[164] 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries Canada Inc. (2001), 204 D.L.R. (4th) 542.
[165] (1858), 27 L.J.M.C. 207.
[166]Ibid. at 208.
[167]William O. Douglas, "Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk" (1928-29), 38
Yale L.J. 584.
[168] Montreal v. Montreal Locomotive Works Ltd. (1946), [1947] 1 D.L.R. 161 (P.C.).
[169]Supra note 157.
[170]1 and 2 Geo. V, c. 46.
[171] (1928), [1929] S.C.R. 166 (hereinafter Québec Asbestos).
[172]Ibid. at 169, 170.
[173] See, e.g., Hill-Clarke-Francis Ltd. v. Northland Groceries (Quebec) Ltd., [1941]
S.C.R. 437; Côté v. Rhéault, [1962] Q.B. 797; Hôpital Notre-Dame de l’Espérance v.
Laurent (1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 605; and Ville de Brossard v. Syndicat des employés de la
Ville de Brossard (C.S.N.), [1990] T.T. 337.
[174] [1978] C.T.C. 2728, 78 D.T.C. 1532 (T.R.B.).
[175] According to this "specific results" test, a contract for services normally contemplates "the
accomplishment of a specified job or task and normally does not require that the contractor do
anything personally’, while a contract of service "does not normally envisage the
accomplishment of a specified amount of work but does normally contemplate the servant
putting his personal services at the disposal of the master during some period of time":
Alexander v. M.N.R., [1969] C.T.C. 715, 70 D.T.C. 6006 (Exch. Ct.) at para. 14. Although
the Court does not cite any specific authority for this test, it refers to two common law cases on
the distinction between employees and independent contractors: Ready Mixed Concrete v.
Minister of Pensions, [1968] 1 All E.R. 433; and Market Investigations Ltd. v. Minister of
Social Security, [1968] 3 All E.R. 732.
[176]Hecht v. M.N.R., [1980] C.T.C. 2513, 80 D.T.C. 1438 (T.R.B.); and Lafleur v.
M.N.R., [1984] C.T.C. 2489, 84 D.T.C. 1478 (T.C.C.).
[177]Braive v. M.N.R., supra note 51.
[178]Ibid. at para. 48.
[179]See, e.g., Tedco Apparel Management Services Inc. v. M.N.R., supra note 51;
Beaulieu v. The Queen, supra note 163; Placements Marcel Lapointe Inc. v. M.N.R., supra
note 163; and Wolf v. The Queen, supra note 51.
[180]Supra note 51.
[181]Ibid. at para. 197, per Tremblay, T.C.J. See also Qureshi v. M.N.R., supra note 163 in
which Tremblay, T.C.J. emphasized (at para. 60) that the determination as to whether an
individual is an employee or an independent contractor must be made in accordance with the
civil law in Quebec and the common law in the other provinces, but concluded (at para. 67) that
"the development of the law in the last 60 years, and particularly in the last 15 or 20 years,
clearly indicates that the emphasis has shifted and that the test of control is no longer decisive."
[182]Supra note 51.
[183]Ibid. at para. 49.
[184]Ibid. at para. 113.
[185]Ibid. at para. 117.
[186]Ibid. at para. 114.
[187]Sauvé v. M.N.R. (1995) 132 D.L.R. (4th) 114 (F.C.A.).
[188]Pursuant to this provision, persons resident in Canada are taxed on their worldwide
incomes. Where Canadian income tax is payable on income subject to tax in another country, a
credit in respect of the foreign tax may be deducted under I.T.A. section 126.
[189]Subsection 2(3) and Division D of Part I of the I.T.A. impose Canadian income tax on
non-residents who in the taxation year were employed in Canada, carried on a business in
Canada, or disposed of a taxable Canadian property. Part XIII imposes a withholding tax on
certain payments to non-residents. These taxes are subject to relieving provisions in various tax
treaties between Canada and other countries.
[190]See, e.g., section 114 of the I.T.A. which provides special rules for individuals "resident in
Canada throughout part of the year and non-resident in Canada throughout another part of the
year"; section 128.1 which triggers a deemed disposition and reacquisition of property at fair
market value when a taxpayer becomes a resident in Canada or ceases to be a resident of
Canada; subparagraphs 20(8)(a)(ii) and 40(2)(a)(i) which prevent non-residents from deducting
reserves in respect of unpaid receivables; the description of B in paragraph 40(2)(b) which
limits the principal residence exemption to taxpayers resident in Canada; subsections 70(6) and
73(1) which limit tax-deferred transfers of property to a spouse or common-law partner or
qualifying trust to transfers where the spouse or common-law partner is resident in Canada;
subsections 70(9) and 73(3) which limit tax deferred transfers of farm property to a child to
transfers where the child is resident in Canada; the attribution rules in sections 74.1 and 74.2
which apply only while the transferee of property is resident in Canada; the definition of
"Canadian partnership" in subsection 102(1) which, together with other provisions, limits the
availability of various tax deferral provisions on transfers of property to or from a partnership to
partnerships "all the members of which were … resident in Canada" at the relevant time; the
definition of "Canadian-controlled private corporation" in subsection 125(7) which limits the
reduced rate of corporate tax to corporations that are not "controlled, directly or indirectly in
any manner whatever, by one or more non-resident persons …"; and subsection 18(4) which
limits otherwise deductible amounts in respect of interest paid or payable to specified non-
residents.
[191]I.T.A., subsection 250(3).
[192]I.T.A., subsection 250(1) and (4). While the first of these rules applies to all persons, the
latter applies only to corporations. Of the various circumstances listed in subsection 250(1), the
most important is the rule in paragraph (a), which deems persons who have "sojourned in
Canada in the year for a period of, or periods the total of which is, 183 days or more" to have
been resident in Canada throughout the year.
[193]I.T.A., subsection 250(5), which deems persons who would otherwise be resident in
Canada not to be resident in Canada if, under a tax treaty with another country, the person is
"resident in the other country and not resident in Canada."
[194]Canada – United States Tax Convention, (1980), Article IV(1). Where an individual is
a resident of both Contracting States under their respective domestic laws, Article IV(2)
provides that the individual’s status shall be determined by: (a) deeming the individual to be a
resident of the Contracting State in which the individual has a "permanent home" or, if the
individual has a permanent home in both Contracting States, in the Contracting State with which
the individual’s "personal and economic relations are closer"; (b) if the Contracting State in
which the individual’s "centre of vital interests" cannot be determined, deeming the individual to
be a resident of the Contracting State in which the individual has a "habitual abode"; (c) if the
individual has an habitual abode in both States or neither State, deeming the individual to be a
resident of the Contracting State in which the individual is a citizen; and (d) if the individual is a
citizen of both Contracting States or neither State, by settling the question by mutual agreement
between the competent authorities of the Contracting States. For similar provisions in the
Canada – United Kingdom Tax Convention, see Articles 4(1) and (2).
[195][1946] C.T.C. 51, 2 D.T.C. 812 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter Thomson). The Thomson case is
among the most cited in Canadian income tax law, and is the starting point for most cases
addressing the concept of individual residence. For useful summaries of these cases, see Brian
G. Hansen, "Individual Residence" in Report of Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Tax
Conference, 1977 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1978), 682-712;
D. Bernard Morris, "Jurisdiction to Tax: An Update" in Report of Proceedings of the Thirty-
First Tax Conference, 1979 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1980),
414-44 at 415-20; Gordon C. Bale, "The Basis of Taxation" in Brian G. Hansen, Vern
Krishna, and James A. Rendall, eds., Canadian Taxation (Don Mills: DeBoo, 1981), 21-57
at 30-42; and Edwin G. Kroft, "Jurisdiction to Tax: An Update" in Tax Planning for Canad-
US and International Transactions, Corporate Management Tax Conference 1993,
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1994), 1:1-138 at 7-10.
[196]R.S.C. 1927, c. 97, as amended.
[197]8 and 9 Geo. 5, c. 40. See the judgments by Kerwin, Rand, and Estey, JJ. In Thomson,
supra note 189.
[198]Levene v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1928] A.C. 217 (H.L.) (hereinafter
Levene); and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Lysaght, [1928] A.C. 234 (H.L.)
(hereinafter Lysaght).
[199]Levene, supra note 198 at p. 232, per Lord Warrington of Clyffe; and Lysaght, supra
note 198 at p. 249, per Lord Warrington of Clyffe.
[200]Lysaght, supra note 198 at p. 247, per Lord Buckmaster.
[201]Levene, supra note 198 at p. 223, per Viscount Cave L.C.
[202]Ibid. at p. 225.
[203]Lysaght, supra note 198 at p. 248.
[204]Levene, supra note 198 at p. 225.
[205]Ibid. Subsequent Canadian cases have differentiated the concepts by extending the
concept of "ordinary residence" to include individuals who leave the country for a year or two
but maintain social or economic connections in Canada. See, e.g., Reeder v. M.N.R., [1975]
C.T.C. 2022, 75 D.T.C. 17 (T.R.B.).
[206]Thomson, supra note 195 at para. 2, per Kerwin J.
[207]Ibid.
[208]Ibid.
[209]Ibid. at para. 59.
[210] Ibid. at para. 71.
[211] Ibid.
[212]Ibid. at para. 47.
[213]Ibid. at para. 50.
[214]The concept of an individual’s domicile is used to determine jurisdiction in private
international law. In common law, this concept has been defined as the jurisdiction in which the
individual "has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and his family, not for a mere special
and temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home, unless
and until something (which is unexpected, or the happening of which is uncertain) shall occur to
induce him to adopt some other permanent home": Lord v. Colvin (1859), 62 E.R. 141 at
145. Although the concept of residence or "habitation" is essential to the determination of an
individual’s domicile under common law, the latter depends crucially on the individual’s intention
to make the residence a "permanent home", and differs significantly from the concept of
residence in that an individual may have more than one residence but only one domicile. For a
useful discussion of the differences between residence for tax purposes and common law
domicile, see Hansen, supra note 195 at 699-700.
[215]Although the majority judgments also refer to English cases to establish the meaning of
these words, these cases themselves reject a special or technical meaning of the words
"resident" and "ordinarily resident", referring instead to dictionary definitions and adopting an
ordinary or "common sense" meaning of the words.
[216]See, e.g., Kroft, supra note 195 at 7; Peter W. Hogg, Joanne E. Magee, and Ted Cook,
Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 3rd ed., (Scarborough: Carswell, 1999) at 126; and
Vern Krishna, Fundamentals of Canadian Income Tax, 6th ed., (Scarborough: Carswell,
2000) at 74.
[217] According to Article 76 of the C.C.Q.: "Change of domicile is effected by actual
residence in another place coupled with the intention of the person to make it the seat of his
principal establishment." For this purpose, Article 77 defines a person’s residence as "the place
where he ordinarily resides", adding that "if a person has more than one residence, his principal
residence is considered in establishing his domicile", while Article 78 deems persons "whose
domicile cannot be determined with certainty … to be domiciled at the place of [their]
residence", and persons who have no residence to be domiciled at the place where they live or,
"if that is unknown, at the place of [their] last known domicile."
[218]See, e.g., section 1 of the Alberta Health Care Insurance Act, RSA 2000, c. A-20,
which defines a "resident" as "a person lawfully entitled to be or to remain in Canada, who
makes the person's home and is ordinarily present in Alberta" excluding "a tourist, transient or
visitor to Alberta"; section 1 of the Medicare Protection Act, RSO 1996, c. 286, which
defines a "resident" as "a person who (a) is a citizen of Canada or is lawfully admitted to
Canada for permanent residence,(b) makes his or her home in British Columbia, and (c) is
physically present in British Columbia at least 6 months in a calendar year" excluding "a tourist
or visitor to British Columbia"; subsection 1(1) of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act,
R.S.O., 1997, c. 41, which defines a "resident" as "a person whose primary residence is
Ontario and who has actually resided in Ontario for a period of at least six months during the 12
months preceding the day that residence becomes material under this Act"; and section 1 of the
Engineering Profession Act, RSPEI 1988, c. E-8.1, which defines a "resident" as "a person
who in the settled routine of life, usually, normally and customarily lives and has his place of
abode in the province".
[219]For the purposes of the Quebec Taxation Act, R.S.Q. c. I-3, section 7.14 explicitly
dissociates the tax concept of residence from the meaning determined under the C.C.Q. This
provision is discussed in section 3.2.2, infra.
[220]For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Marie-Pierre Allard, "The Retroactive Effect of
Conditional Obligations in Tax Law" (2001), 49 Can. Tax J. 1726-1939.
[221]According to this provision, "depreciable property" of a taxpayer is defined as "property
acquired by the taxpayer in respect of which the taxpayer has been allowed, or would, if the
taxpayer owned the property at the end of the year … be entitled to a deduction under
paragraph 20(1)(a) in computing income for that year or a preceding taxation year" [emphasis
added].
[222]See, e.g., subsection 39(1) of the I.T.A., which defines a capital gain and a capital loss as
the gain or loss from the disposition of capital property. See also the description of F in the
definition of "undepreciated capital cost" subsection 13(21) of the I.T.A., which requires
proceeds from the disposition of depreciable property of a particular class (not exceeding the
original capital cost of the property) to be subtracted in computing the undepreciated capital
cost of the class, which may trigger an income inclusion for recaptured depreciation under
subsection 13(1) or a terminal loss under subsection 20(16); and the description of E in the
definition of "cumulative eligible capital" in subsection 14(5) of the I.T.A., which provides for a
similar tax result on the disposition of eligible capital property.
[223]See the definition of "disposition" in I.T.A. subsection 248(1).
[224]See the definition of "proceeds of disposition" in I.T.A. subsection 13(21) and section 54.
[225]Supra note 57.
[226]See the discussion at supra, text accompanying notes 57-60.
[227]Supra note 58.
[228]Wardean Drilling, supra note 57 at para. 26.
[229] See e.g., The Queen v. Henuset Brothers Ltd. (No. 2), [1977] C.T.C. 228, 77 D.T.C.
5169 (F.C.T.D.); Kamsel Leasing Inc. v. M.N.R., [1993] 1 C.T.C. 2279, 93 D.T.C. 250
(T.C.C.); and Gartry v. Canada, [1994] 2 C.T.C. 2021, 94 D.T.C. 1947 (T.C.C.).
[230]See, e.g., Kinguk Trawl Inc. v. The Queen, [2002] 2 C.T.C. 2229, 2002 D.T.C. 1399
(T.C.C.) at para. 123, citing Wardean Drilling for the proposition that: "The concept of
beneficial ownership, which might differ from strict legal ownership, is well recognized in the
case law."
[231] [1962] C.T.C. 614, 62 D.T.C. 1378 (Exch. Ct.).
[232]Ibid. at para. 48. Given the statutory definitions of disposition and proceeds of disposition,
however, the Court concluded that this meaning had been modified to include any sale "as soon
as a taxpayer is entitled to the sale price of the property sold." See ibid. at para. 54.
[233][1987] 1 C.T.C. 2258, 87 D.T.C. 148 (T.C.C.).
[234]Ibid. at para. 21.
[235]See, e.g., Browning Harvey Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1990] 1 C.T.C. 161, 90 D.T.C. 6105
(T.C.T.D.); and Borstad Welding Supplies (1972) Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1993] 2 C.T.C. 266, 93
D.T.C. 5457 (F.C.T.D.).
[236] See, e.g., Fortin & Moreau Inc. v. M.N.R., [1990] 1 C.T.C. 2583, 90 D.T.C. 1436
(T.C.C.), rev’d on appeal in Construction Bérou Inc. v. The Queen, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 174,
99 D.T.C. 5868 (F.C.A.); D. Dumais et Fils Inc. v. M.N.R., [1991] 1 C.T.C. 2650, 92
D.T.C. 1107 (T.C.C.); Location Gaétan Lévesque Inc. v. M.N.R., [1991] 2 C.T.C. 2795,
91 D.T.C. 1380 (T.C.C.); and Laurent Goulet & Fils Inc. v. M.N.R., [1992] 1 C.T.C. 2419,
92 D.T.C. 1605 (T.C.C.).
[237]Supra note 31.
[238]Supra note 57. See text accompanying note 228.
[239]Olympia & York Developments, supra note 31 at para. 42.
[240]Ibid. at para. 44.
[241] Robert Bédard Auto Ltée v. M.N.R., [1985] 2 C.T.C. 2354, 85 D.T.C. 643 (T.C.C.)
at para. 49. See also Larose v. M.N.R., [1992] 2 C.T.C. 2339, 92 D.T.C. 2055 (T.C.C.).
[242] Supra note 236 (hereinafter Construction Bérou).
[243]See paragraphs (e) and (f) of the definition of "disposition" in subsection 248(1), which
excludes various kinds of transfers "as a consequence of which there is no change in the
beneficial ownership of the property".
[244]Construction Bérou, supra note 236 at para. 6 of Desjardins J.A.’s judgment. See also
ibid. at para. 2 of Létourneau J.A.’s judgment, emphasizing that "the attempt by Parliament to
harmonize the two systems with a view to providing fair and equal treatment to all Canadian
taxpayers cannot be doubted", and concluding on this basis that the Court must adopt "a
judicial interpretation which allows for the implementation of this legislative intent."
[245]Ibid. at para. 14 of Létourneau J.A.’s judgment.
[246] [1981] C.T.C. 2935, 81 D.T.C. 824 (T.R.B.) (hereinafter Jacoby).
[247] Although the deduction for spousal support payments is still found in paragraph 60(b) of
the I.T.A., the requirement that these payments must be "payable … under an order of a
competent tribunal or under a written agreement" now appears in subsection 60.1(2).
[248] Jacoby, supra note 246 at para. 31-49.
[249]Ibid. at para. 172.
[250]Ibid. at para. 170.
[251]See, e.g., Simpson v. The Queen, [1996] 2 C.T.C. 2687 (T.C.C.); and Foley v. The
Queen, [2000] 4 C.T.C. 2016 (T.C.C.).
[252]See, e.g., Hodson v. M.N.R., [1988] 1 C.T.C. 2, 88 D.T.C. 6001 (F.C.A.);
MacLachlin v. The Queen, [1992] 1 C.T.C. 2089, 92 D.T.C. 1024 (T.C.C.); Jaskot v.
M.N.R., [1992] 1 C.T.C. 2145, 92 D.T.C. 1102 (T.C.C.); McMillan v. The Queen, [1995] 1
C.T.C. 2678 (T.C.C.); Risula v. The Queen, [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2125 (T.C.C.); Von Neudegg
v. The Queen, [1999] 2 C.T.C. 2525 (T.C.C.); Friesen v. The Queen, [2001] 1 C.T.C.
2208 (T.C.C.); and McIntosh v. The Queen, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 2423 (T.C.C.).
[253][1993] 2 C.T.C. 2447 (T.C.C.) (hereinafter Démolition A.M. de l’Est Du Québec).
[254] See paragraph (c) of the definition of "manufacturing or processing" in subsection
125.1(3) of the I.T.A., which specifically excludes "construction" from manufacturing or
processing activities, the profits from which are eligible for the deduction.
[255]Démolition A.M. de l’Est Du Québec, supra note 253 atpara. 33. For a similar
conclusion, see The Queen v. Nova Construction Co., [1986] 1 C.T.C. 68, 85 D.T.C. 5594
(F.C.A.) at para. 9-10, endorsing the view of the trial judge that the word "construction" is "not
a term of art".
[256] Ibid. at para. 34.
[257] [2001] 4 C.T.C. 174, 2001 D.T.C. 5233 (F.C.A.) (hereinafter Marcoux).
[258] According to this provision: "Where the Minister has knowledge or suspects that a
person is, or will be within one year, liable to make a payment to another person who is liable to
make a payment under this Act (in this subsection … referred to as the "tax debtor"), the
Minister may in writing require the person to pay forthwith, where the moneys are immediately
payable, and in any other case as and when the moneys become payable, the moneys otherwise
payable to the tax debtor in whole or in part to the Receiver General on account of the tax
debtor’s liability under this Act."
[259] Marcoux v. Canada, [2000] 4 C.T.C. 143, 2000 D.T.C. 6010 (F.C.T.D.).
[260] Ibid. at para. 16.
[261] Ibid.
[262]Marcoux, supra note 257 at para. 10.
[263]Ibid. para. 13.
[264]Supra note 110.
[265]Marcoux, supra note 257 at para. 13.
[266]See notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
[267] An Act for making more effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of
Quebec in North America,(U.K.) 14 Geo. III, c. 83.
[268]On the expression of bijuralism in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, see Allard,
"The Supreme Court of Canada and its Impact on the Expression of Bijuralism" supra note 9;
and Louise Lavallée, "Bijuralism in the Supreme Court of Canada since the Enactment of the
Civil Code of Quebec" in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of
the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet 3. For a recent
judicial expression of bijuralism, see Décary J.A.’s judgment in Attorney General of Canada
and Treasury Board of Canada v. Constance St-Hilaire (2001), 204 D.L.R. (4th) 103
(F.C.A.).
[269]Lionel A. Levert, "The Cohabitation of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in Federal Legislation in
Canada: Myth or Reality?" in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law
of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet 1, 5 at 6.
[270] See Allard, "The Supreme Court of Canada and its Impact on the Expression of
Bijuralism" supra note 9 at 3-12.
[271]Pantel v. Air Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 472 at 478.
[272]See Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054;
McNamara v. R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654; and R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction Co. (1958)
Ltd., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695. For a useful discussion of these cases, see Allard, "The Supreme
Court of Canada and its Impact on the Expression of Bijuralism" supra note 9 at 22-26.
[273]Levert, "The Cohabitation of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in Federal Legislation in Canada:
Myth or Reality?" supra note 269 at 6.
[274]Department of Justice, "Policy on Legislative Bijuralism" Appendix III to Wellington,
"Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and Terminology" supra note 14 at 22.
[275] Ibid. at 23.
[276] See Marie-Claude Gervais, "Program to Harmonize Federal Legislation with The Civil
Law of the Province of Quebec, Assumption of Complementarity and Methodological Issues"
in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of
Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet 1, 10 at 11-12.
[277] Roderick A. Macdonald, "Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and
Provincial Law: The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law" in The Harmonization of Federal
Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism, Collection of Studies
(Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1999) 27 at 69. See also Levert, "The Cohabitation
of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in Federal Legislation in Canada: Myth or Reality?" supra note
269 at 5, emphasizing the "moral duty" on Parliament "to take the two systems of law into
account in its legislation … when it sets out standards the application of which intersect with
provincial private law."
[278] A First Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of the province of Quebec
and to amend certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into
account the common law and the civil law, 1st Sess., 36th Parl, 1997-98 (tabled on June 12,
1998).
[279] The main statutes are the Federal Real Property Act S.C. 1991, c. 50; the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21; and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
[280] R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21.
[281] A First Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of the province of Quebec
and to amend certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into
account the common law and the civil law, 2nd Sess., 36th Parl., 2000.
[282] A First Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of the province of Quebec
and to amend certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into
account the common law and the civil law, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001.
[283]S.C. 2001, c. 4.
[284]For a detailed review of the origins and content of Bill S-4, see Marie-Noëlle Pourbaix,
"S-4: A First Harmonization Bill" in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the
Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet 6, 1-
12.
[285]For a useful explanation of the rationale for and intended effect of these amendments, see
Henry L. Molot, "Clause 8 of Bill S-4: Amending the Interpretation Act" in The
Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and
Canadian Bijuralism, supra note 6, Booklet 6.
[286]Supra note 283. Of the various statements in the Preamble to this statute, the most
relevant for the interpretation of new section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act are that "the
harmonious interaction of federal and provincial legislation is essential and lies in an
interpretation of federal legislation that is compatible with the common law or civil law traditions,
as the case may be" and that "the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is the
law that completes federal legislation when applied in a province, unless otherwise provided by
law".
[287] See, e.g., Molot, "Clause 8 of Bill S-4: Amending the Interpretation Act" supra note
285 at 15: "In the context of "interpreting an enactment", it is implicit that recourse to provincial
rules, principles or concepts is "necessary" for the purpose of interpreting and applying the
enactment. If a federal enactment, expressly or impliedly, relies on a provincial rule, concept or
principle that relates to "property and civil rights", it may not be possible to fully understand and
apply the federal enactment without recourse to that provincial rule, concept or principle.
Reference to the latter is therefore "necessary" in order to accurately interpret and apply the
federal enactment."
[288]See, e.g., ibid. at 18: "Federal legislation may make it "unnecessary to refer" to provincial
private law principles, or may express an intention that reference not be made to rules, etc. of
the province concerned. For example, such legislation could so comprehensively define its
terms as to implicitly exclude any reference to provincial private law as the external source of
interpretation and application. Federal legislation could also expressly refer to some other
source of interpretation thereby demonstrating a contrary intent as regards it being "necessary to
refer to a province’s rules …."
[289] See ibid. at 19, suggesting that the expression "unless otherwise provided by law" is
triggered by "a legislative provision to the contrary".
[290] See, e.g., Brisson and Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity,
Dissociation" supra note 10 at 237. See also André Morel, "Harmonizing Federal Legislation
with the Civil Code of Québec: Why and Wherefore?" in The Harmonization of Federal
Legislation with Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism, Collection of Studies
(Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1999) 1 at 6, explaining that this "helps create the
impression that there is a sort of organic bond, an association inherent in the nature of things,
between federal law and common law – and the language used in those statutes tends to
reinforce that impression."
[291] See, e.g., Brisson and Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity,
Dissociation" supra note 10 at 235; and Bastarache, "Bijuralism in Canada" supra note 9 at
21.
[292] See, e.g., Brisson and Morel, "Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity,
Dissociation" supra note 10 at 237; and Morel, "Harmonizing Federal Legislation with the Civil
Code of Québec: Why and Wherefore?" supra note 290 at 7.
[293] See, e.g., Roderick A. Macdonald, "Provincial Law and Federal Commercial Law: Is
Atomic Slipper a New Beginning?" (1992) 7 B.F.L.R. 437-51 at 447, suggesting that
provincial law in respect of property and civil rights should be subject to displacement by
federal law only "explicitly" or "by absolutely necessary implication" [emphasis in original].
See also Markevich, supra note 110 at para. 25, suggesting that while the I.T.A. "may
excluded application of general legal principles, rules and remedies", this can only be
accomplished by "express language or necessary implication to that effect."
[294]Macdonald, "Provincial Law and Federal Commercial Law: Is Atomic Slipper a New
Beginning?" supra note 293 at 450.
[295]Levert, "The Cohabitation of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in Federal Legislation in Canada:
Myth or Reality?" supra note 269 at 8.
[296]Supra note 52.
[297]See the cases listed at supra note 47.
[298]See, e.g., Kalef, supra note 97; and Wheeliker, supra note 100.
[299] See, e.g., Will-Kare, supra note 64.
[300] On the use of provincial private law for this purpose, see Roderick A. Macdonald,
"Encoding Canadian Civil Law" in Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau, (Cowansville: Yvon Blais,
1997) 579 at 592. See also Macdonald, "Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of
Federal and Provincial Law: The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law" supra note 277 at 43.
[301]Supra note 71.
[302]See, e.g., Garant v. M.N.R., supra note 43; Feder v. M.N.R., supra note 74;
Stockman v. The Queen, supra note 76; and Holizki, supra note 78.
[303]See, e.g., Furfaro-Siconolfi v. The Queen, supra note 44; Gardner v. M.N.R., supra
note 81; Savoie v. The Queen, supra note 83; and Biderman, supra note 84.
[304]See, e.g., Hillis, supra note 90; and Boger Estate v. The Queen, supra note 88.
[305]See, e.g., Perron v. M.N.R., supra note 25; The Queen v. Lagueux & Frères Inc.,
supra note 28; Wardean Drilling, supra note 57; West Kootenay, supra note 61; and Dale,
supra note 106.
[306]See, e.g., Morel, "Harmonizing Federal Legislation with the Civil Code of Québec: Why
and Wherefore?" supra note 290 at 7; and Gervais, "Program to Harmonize Federal
Legislation with the Civil Law of Quebec, Assumption of Complementarity and Methodological
Issues" supra note 276 at 15.
[307]Supra note 110.
[308]Supra note 111.
[309] Markevich, supra note 110 at para. 25.
[310] See Part 2, supra.
[311]Supra note 134.
[312]See supra section 2.2.
[313]Supra note 195.
[314]See supra section 2.4.
[315]See the discussion at supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
[316]See the discussion at supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
[317]See the discussion at supra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
[318]Supra note 124.
[319]Supra note 129.
[320]See supra section 2.1.
[321]Supra note 31.
[322]Supra note 236.
[323]See supra section 2.5.
[324] See supra section 2.3.
[325]Supra note 51.
[326]See Part 1, supra.
[327] See, e.g., Durnford, "Employee or Independent Contractor? The Interplay Between the
Civil Code and the Income Tax Act" supra note 151 at 282, observing that courts should not
"jump too quickly to the conclusion that the mere fact that the same word appears both in the
[Income Tax] Act and the Civil Code necessarily results in the private law’s definition being
applied."
[328]Supra note 64.
[329]Ibid. at para. 68.
[330]Supra note 195.
[331]See supra section 2.4.
[332] Supra note 246.
[333] Supra note 253.
[334] See the discussion at supra text accompanying notes 246-56.
[335]Supra note 257.
[336]Ibid. at para. 13.
[337] See supra sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5. Although some cases have described the
definition of a "gift" that courts have generally adopted for tax purposes as its "ordinary"
meaning, the authorities cited for this concept and the distinction between it and the definition in
the C.C.Q. confirm its common law origins. See the discussion at supra notes 118-19 and
accompanying text.
[338]See supra sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.5.
[339]See the argument at supra notes 289-94 and accompanying text.
[340] See Littler, supra note 124; and Gervais, supra note 129.
[341]See the discussion at supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
[342]See the discussion at supra note 142 and accompanying text.
[343]Supra note 134.
[344]Ibid. at para. 28.
[345]See the discussion at supra notes 149-51.
[346]Supra note 152.
[347]See supra section 2.3.
[348]See, e.g., Tedco Apparel Management Services Inc. v. M.N.R., supra note 51;
Beaulieu v. The Queen, supra note 163; and Placements Marcel Lapointe Inc. v. M.N.R.,
supra note 163.
[349]See, e.g., Desjardins J.A.’s judgment in Wolf v. The Queen, supra note 51.
[350]See, e.g., Décary J.A.’s judgment in ibid., which emphasized (at para. 117) that "[t]he
test … is whether, looking at the total relationship of the parties, there is control on the one hand
and subordination on the other."
[351] See the definition of "disposition" in I.T.A., subsection 248(1).
[352]See the definition of "proceeds of disposition" in I.T.A. subsection 13(21) and section 54.
[353]For a similar point, see Allard, "The Retroactive Effect of Conditional Obligations in Tax
Law" supra note 220 at 1796, observing that although the definition of a "disposition" in
subsection 248(1) excludes transfers of legal ownership without beneficial ownership, it does
not specifically provide for the "opposite result – that is, that a transfer of beneficial ownership
without legal ownership would constitute a disposition".
[354]Supra note 31.
[355]Ibid. at para. 42.
[356]Supra note 57 at para. 26, concluding that property is acquired for tax purposes "when
title has passed, assuming that the assets exist at that time, or when the purchaser has all the
incidents of title, such as possession, use and risk, although legal title may remain in the vendor
as security for the purchase price as is the commercial practice under conditional sales
agreements."
[357]Supra note 236.
[358]See Interpretation Bulletin IT-110R3, "Gifts and Official Donation Receipts" (June 20,
1997), para. 4-8.
[359]See, e.g., Bromley, "Flaunting and Flouting the Law of Gift" supra note 116.
[360]See Duff, "Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax" supra note 131.
[361]See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
[362]See supra note 142.
[363]Supra note 134.
[364]Supra note 135.
[365] See, e.g., David G. Duff, "Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions in Canada: Theory,
Practice and Reform" in Proceedings of Annual Conference of the National Center on
Philanthropy and the Law: Reformation of the Charitable Contribution Deduction, (New
York University School of Law, 2001).
[366]See supra section 2.3.
[367] Although Professor Durnford concludes that "[t]he number of situations where the
judgments in income tax cases rendered in Quebec would vary from those rendered in other
provinces would probably be quite limited", the very development of the economic reality and
integration tests to address limitations of the traditional control test suggest that this may not be
true. See Durnford, "Employee or Independent Contractor? The Interplay Between the Civil
Code and the Income Tax Act" supra note 151 at 308.
[368]See supra section 2.5.
[369]See the argument to this effect in section 3.1.1., supra.
[370]Supra note 31.
[371]Supra note 236.
[372]See the argument to this effect in section 3.1.1., supra.
[373]R.S.Q., c. I-3.
[374] According to Article 2186 of the C.C.Q, a partnership is defined as "a contract by which
the parties, in a spirit of cooperation, agree to carry on an activity, including the operation of an
enterprise, to contribute thereto by combining property, knowledge or activities and to share
any resulting profits". In contrast, partnership statutes in common law provinces have codified
the common law definition of a partnership as "the relation that subsists between persons
carrying on a business in common with a view to a profit".
[375]For a preliminary discussion of this issue, see Cuerrier, "The Harmonization of Federal
Tax Legislation" supra note 20 at 14-16.
[376]See, e.g., Derby Development Corporation v. M.N.R. (1962), 28 Tax A.B.C. 221, 62
D.T.C. 18 at para. 5; Hollinger, supra note 47 at para. 40; Cornforth, supra note 47 at para.
59-66; Berg v. M.N.R., [1982] C.T.C. 2558 (T.R.B.); Waxman, supra note 47 at para. 49;
Spire Freezers Ltd. v. The Queen, [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2764, 98 D.T.C. 1287 (T.C.C.) at para.
66; and Backman v. The Queen, 97 D.T.C. 1468 (T.C.C.) at para. 66.
[377]Macdonald, "Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and Provincial Law:
The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law" supra note 277 at 66.